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Banks and Inner Cities: Market and Regulatory
Obstacles to Development Lending
Keith N. Hylton

t

Why are poor inner cities underserved by financial institutions, and
why is it so difficult to find a solution to this problem? Explanations of the
lending shortfall problem range between theories based on discrimination
to the view that the lending market is working flawlessly. Drawing largely
on the economic development literature, I elaborate an alternative
explanation here. The asymmetric information theory I offer yields the
prediction that urban minority communities will be underserved by
financialinstitutions even in the absence of discriminatoryintent.
I claim that the existing framework of banking regulation is in part
responsiblefor the difficulty in finding a solution to the lending shortfall
problem. The existing regulatory framework makes it difficult for large
.scale development-oriented lending institutionsto emerge. This is a result
of the conflict between fair lending and safety regulation. Relatively small
development-oriented banks are constrainedby their own prudence or by
safety regulators to diversify their loan portfolios, limiting the amount of
lending geared toward community development. However, fair lending
regulators, specifically Community Reinvestment Act examiners, give
banks poor evaluations on the basis of a conservative lending policy.
Banks that areforced to choose between satisfying the safety and the fair
lending requirements will choose the former, since a failure to satisfy
safety demands can lead to harsh disciplinaryaction by regulators.
An ideal regime would encourage development-oriented banks to
expand and adopt a safety regulation scheme that gives banks greater
freedom to lend in poor communities. This implies both that the CRA
should be modified so that it no longer prevents the expansion of small
development-oriented banks that have followed a conservative lending
policy and that deposit insurance should be privatized.
In spite of the potential benefits from these changes, they are unlikely
to be observed in the nearfuture, because the existing regime represents a
political equilibrium supported by dominant interest group coalitions.
Lending pressure groups, regulators, virtually all local politicians, and
some national politicians generally benefit from the existing enforcement
t
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A.B., 1982, Harvard College; J.D.,
1982, Harvard Law School; Ph.D. (Economics), 1986, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This
paper is an outgrowth of comments I made on the Community Reinvestment Act at the Federalist
Society's "Banking in the New Millennium" conference, held June 4, 1999, at Washington University
School of Law in St. Louis, Missouri. I have benefited from many remarks by participants in that
conference, especially George Kaufman and Bert Ely.
Copyright ( 2000 by Yale Journal on Regulation

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 17:197, 2000

regime for the CRA. More surprisingly, large banks enjoy some benefits
andprobably benefit overallfrom the existing CRA enforcement regime.
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Introduction
Why are relatively poor inner cities underserved by financial
institutions, and why is it so difficult to find a solution to this problem?
Explanations of the lending shortfall problem range between theories
based on discrimination to the view that progressive banking laws impede
the functioning of the lending market.' Drawing largely on the economic
I
For a sophisticated treatment of discrimination theory and the lending shortfall problem,
see Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics

198

Banks and Inner Cities
development literature, I elaborate an alternative explanation here.2 Under
the asymmetric information theory, credit rationing occurs because the
lender cannot distinguish good and bad credit risks, and therefore charges
the same interest rate regardless of actual risk, while restricting the amount
that can be borrowed The application of the asymmetric information
theory in this Article yields the prediction that urban minority communities
will be underserved by financial institutions-indeed, that minority loan
applicants will experience discrimination, in the sense that they will be
rejected more often and will have to meet greater burdens in the
creditworthiness assessment process-even in the absence of
discriminatory intent. The market does indeed fail under this explanation,
but reluctance to lend and seemingly discriminatory practices are observed
largely as a byproduct of institutional and environmental constraints.
Moreover, the asymmetric information model has an advantage over the
discrimination theory, in the sense that it is not as vulnerable to the critique
that profit-seeking and competition should cure any potential market
failure.
I claim that the existing framework of banking regulation is in part
responsible for the difficulty in finding a solution to the lending shortfall
problem. The institutional and environmental constraints that make
lending within relatively poor communities difficult can be surmounted, as
demonstrated by alternatives to traditional banking institutions, such as the
South Shore Bank of Chicago and the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.4
However, the existing regulatory framework makes it difficult for largeAnalysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787 (1995). For an argument that widespread credit discrimination blocks
home ownership and small business creation, see Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance and Community
Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive
Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1474-76 (1994). For a critique of development lending
regulation that takes the view that the lending market works more efficiently without the Community
Reinvestment Act, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An
Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993). For an overview of market-failure theories of the
lending shortfall problem, see Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination:
Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237,
253-62 (1996); and Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented
Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1565-72 (1995).
2
1 hasten to add that I am elaborating a credit-shortage theory that is quite well developed,
beginning with Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981).
3
For examples of the application of the asymmetric information theory in the economic
development literature, see sources cited supra note 1; and infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
What distinguishes the analysis in this paper from previous efforts to explain the lending problem in
inner cities is the level of detail at which I apply the asymmetric information theory. Brief discussions
of the credit rationing theory in the context of inner cities can be found in Hylton & Rougeau, supra
note 1, at 258-59; and Klausner, supra note 1, at 1566-68. 1 have gone into considerable detail here in
applying the theory to inner-city lending to provide a better understanding of lending market failure
and to understand the ways in which regulation may worsen or improve the market-failure problem.
4
On the South Shore Bank and Grameen Bank development lending models, see infra
notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
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scale development-oriented lending institutions to emerge. This is, in part,
a result of the conflict between fair lending and safety regulation.
Relatively small development-oriented banks are constrained by their own
prudence or by safety regulators to diversify their loan portfolios, limiting
the amount of lending geared toward community development. However,
fair lending regulators, specifically examiners for the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA), 5 give banks poor evaluations on the basis of a
conservative lending policy. 6 Banks that are forced to choose between
satisfying the safety and the fair lending requirements will choose the
former, since a failure to satisfy safety demands can lead to harsh
disciplinary action by regulators. This tendency toward conservative
lending, in turn, will limit their expansion possibilities because CRA
records are taken into account in the review of expansion applications.
An ideal regime would encourage development-oriented banks to
expand and would adopt a safety regulation scheme that gives banks
greater freedom to lend in poor communities. For example, a private
deposit insurance scheme could, in theory, give banks greater freedom to
experiment with lending policies that may violate safety standards
imposed by federal regulators. A private insurance scheme would allow
banks to break out of a one-size-fits-all safety regulation regime and would
encourage insurers to specialize in covering the risks of community
development lending. Thus, counter to common intuition, a privatized (or
at least decentralized) safety regime could encourage more development
lending, with no reduction in safety. This implies both that the CRA
should be modified so that it no longer prevents expansion by small
development-oriented banks that have followed a conservative lending
policy and, simultaneously, that deposit insurance should be privatized.
Despite the potential benefits from these changes, they are unlikely to
occur in the near future. The current regulatory regime is likely to remain
intact for many years, largely because the existing regime represents a
political equilibrium supported by dominant interest group coalitions.
Lending pressure groups, regulators, virtually all local politicians, and
some national politicians generally benefit from the existing enforcement
regime for the CRA. More surprisingly, large banks probably benefit
overall from the existing CRA enforcement scheme. CRA compliance
costs are lower for them, for many reasons. In addition to scale economies,
the large banks have access to the most creditworthy candidates among
those satisfying CRA obligations, leaving the less creditworthy applicants
to their smaller competitors. The large banks have an easier time crosssubsidizing unprofitable activities with profits from other lines of
5
6
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12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994).
See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 317-18.
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business. 7 Given these advantages, large banks probably are comfortable
with the current regime, because CRA regulation provides them with a
competitive advantage relative to their smaller rivals, foreign rivals, and
potential rivals, such as Internet banks.8
The CRA, in other words, remains durable because it operates in a
manner that fractures opposition among the most concentrated, wellorganized interest group: the banks. Moreover, unlike many other
regulations in the banking area, the CRA is unlikely to be made obsolete
by technological change. My position on the political economy of CRA
reform differs from that of Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, who have
presented the only other interest-group theoretic analysis of the CRA.
Macey and Miller suggest that banks are uniformly opposed to the CRA
but are unable to bring about reform because of political impotence. 9 In
contrast, I argue that the inability among banks to effect reform has almost
nothing to do with political impotence and very much to do with the
invisible competition barriers provided by the CRA.
There are general lessons here for the theory of regulatory reform.
First, fracturing the dominant regulated interest group can keep a
regulatory statute on the books. The CRA, as it is currently enforced,
accomplishes this task by providing a competitive barrier that benefits
large banks. Second, the malleability of a statute reduces the likelihood of
its obsolescence through technological change. While many commentators
have complained about the uncertainty of the CRA,' ° this uncertainty is a
major reason for its continuing vitality. Other banking regulations that
were more specific, definite, and clear than the CRA regulations, such as
branching restrictions, were rendered obsolete by technological change
well before they were repealed." Third, as a positive prediction, regulators
will attempt to interpret the CRA in the future to prevent its being made
obsolete by new technology and to continue to fracture opposition among
established banks.
In Part I of this Article, I provide an overview of developmentoriented banking legislation. In Part II, I discuss the economics of
development lending in inner cities, applying the asymmetric information
model to lending markets for the urban poor and identifying specific
market imperfections and potential market-based solutions. Part III
7
For the argument that such cross-subsidization is central to the CRA's effects on lending,
see Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong
Direction, 20 FoRDHAM URn. L.J. 281, 283-87 (1993).
8
On the competitive benefits provided to large banks, see infra notes 133-42 and
accompanying text.
9
See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 343-44.
10
See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 1, at 1561 (stating that the CRA is "a model of
ambiguity"); Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 326 ("CRA ratings are inexact and subjective.").
11
See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
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discusses existing regulatory obstacles to development lending, including
regulations that worsen market imperfections and hinder market-based
solutions. Part IV provides an interest-group analysis of the CRA,
emphasizing general lessons for regulatory reform.
I.

Regulatory Efforts To Promote Inner-City Development

Congress acknowledged the existence of an economic development
problem in many of the nation's cities when it passed the CRA in 1977.12
The Act's purpose was to encourage commercial banks and savings
institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they
are chartered. 3 Although the CRA is often described as a response to
redlining,14 the legislative history suggests that Congress was equally
concerned with reversing, or at least halting, a general pattern of
disinvestment from older, inner-city communities. 5
The CRA is directed at four regulatory agencies: the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of
Thrift Supervision.' 6 The statute provides that regulators should evaluate a
financial institution's CRA performance in the course of regulatory

examinations and that regulators may take an institution's CRA
performance into account in "an application for a deposit facility by such
institution[]."' 7 In practice, this means that regulatory agencies consider
CRA performance when a financial institution seeks approval for a charter,
12
For an overview of the CRA, see Griffith L. Garwood & Delores S. Smith, The
Community Reinvestment Act: Evolution and Current Issues, 79 FED. RESERVE BULL. 251 (1993); and
A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431, 143982 (1995).
13
According to 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994):
(a) The Congress finds that(1) regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate that their
deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which
they are chartered to do business; (2) the convenience and needs of communities
include the need for credit services as well as deposit services; and (3) regulated
financial institutions have continuing and affirmative obligation [sic] to help meet
the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered. (b) It is the
purpose of this chapter to require each appropriate Federal financial supervisory
agency to use its authority when examining financial institutions, to encourage
such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which
they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such
institutions.
14
See, e.g., Hylton & Rougeau, supra note I, at 241; Overby, supra note 12, at 1446. As
Hylton and Rougeau explain, "Financial institutions were known to outline entire metropolitan
geographic zones in red to indicate to lending officers that no loans should be made for houses in those
regions. These redlined areas were disproportionately located in minority and low- to moderate-income
neighborhoods." Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 1, at 241.
15
See Garwood & Smith, supra note 12, at 251; Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 1,at 241.
16
See 12 U.S.C.§ 2902(1)(A)-(D); Garwood & Smith, supranote 12, at 252.
17
12 U.S.C. § 2903(2).
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a merger, an acquisition, a branch, an office relocation, or deposit
insurance.' There are four possible ratings given to financial institutions
under the CRA: outstanding; satisfactory; needs to improve; and
substantial noncompliance.19
The statute's impact on bank behavior is difficult to assess, because it
is only within the last ten years that agencies have begun to signal that
CRA compliance may be a key issue in the expansion approval process.2 °
This change of stance has occurred in response to pressure from
community organizations, not because the agencies simultaneously
decided to take CRA enforcement seriously.2' The CRA does not create
private rights of action on the part of individuals.2 2 However, community
groups have taken advantage of greater public access to information on the
banks' community lending performance to put pressure on regulators-and
the banks themselves-in the course of public hearings. 23 Regulators
apparently have felt a need to respond to the community groups by forcing
banks to make changes in order to alleviate the CRA concerns raised by
these groups. This phenomenon, in turn, has emboldened the community
groups to continue to protest bank expansions, particularly mergers and
acquisitions.
An additional factor complicating the assessment of the CRA's
impact on banks is uncertainty over the compliance standards. Banks have
complained over the years of uneven and unpredictable CRA
enforcement,2 4 and compliance standards were recently revised in 1995.25
In general, there are two models of compliance standards: a "soft"
subjective evaluation process that permits a bank essentially to make its
own case for a good CRA grade, and a "hard" quantitative process that
examines numerical evidence on lending and deposits.26 The soft model
has dominated over most of the history of the CRA, but recent revisions
have shifted the assessment process toward the hard model.27 It is probably
18
19

See Garwood & Smith, supra note 12, at 252.
See 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2)(A)-(D).

20

See, e.g., Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 1, at 243-44.

21
See id. at 244.
22
See, e.g., Lee v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 118 F.3d 905, 910-14 (2d
Cir. 1997); Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 970 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Lara L.
Spencer, Note, Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act: The Courthouse Doors Are Closed, 2 N.C.

BANKING INST. 169 (1998) (summarizing and discussing Lee).
23
On the involvement of community pressure groups in the regulatory approval process,
see Macey & Miller, supra note 1,at 333-37.
24
See id. at 328.
25
For a discussion of the revised enforcement rules, see E.L. Baldinucci, The Community
Reinvestment Act: New Standards Provide New Hope, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 846-56 (1996);
Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, The Community Reinvestment Act: Questionable Premises
and Perverse Incentives, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 163, 168 (1999).
26
See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 25, at 167-70, 186 (discussing recent regulatory
revisions and general approaches to evaluating CRA compliance).
27
See id.
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too early to tell whether the recent shift has led to a change in the behavior
of banks. Nonetheless, in spite of the uncertainty, it is possible to state
some general activities that regulators look for in determining compliance.
The Mortgage Bankers Association of America suggests the following: (1)

staffing and training lender personnel for CRA compliance; (2) identifying
and communicating with community input groups; (3) conducting selfexaminations for CRA compliance; (4) marketing progress in investment
activity to the surrounding community; and (5) maintaining adequate

documentation of community investment efforts.28
The concerns over uncertainty in enforcement would seem
unimportant if it could be shown that the CRA has had a substantial
positive impact on development in depressed areas. Conflicting evidence
has been presented by neutral parties as well as the statute's critics and
proponents. 29 However, overall the empirical evidence is quite scant; there
have been few rigorous empirical evaluations of the impact of the CRA.30

Much evidence has been presented that cities are on the rebound31 and that
mortgage and business lending by banks has increased in depressed
areas. 32 But this evidence is insufficient to prove that the CRA has had a
substantial positive impact on economic development in inner cities.

There are many other factors that could explain the improving
economic statistics in lending markets for the urban poor. Interest rates

28
See PAUL H. SCHIEBER & DENNIS REPLANSKY, THE LENDER'S GUIDE TO CONSUMER
COMPLIANCE AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 33-39 (1991).

29
Several news articles have reported statistics assembled by the National Community
Reinvestment Coalition showing that the CRA has led to more than $1 trillion in loans in underserved
areas. See, e.g., Jacob M. Schlesinger & Michael Schroeder, Law Requiring Banks To Aid Poor
Communities Faces UncertainFuture as Gramm Mounts Attack, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1999, at A24.
For an article suggesting that the CRA has had little, if any, effect on lending, see Jeffery W.
Gunther et al., Redlining or Red Herring?, Sw. ECON., FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, May/June
1999, at 8, 11-12 (reporting that the share of home purchase loans by CRA-covered banks remained at
approximately 11.5% from 1993 to 1997, while the share of such loans by non-CRA institutions
increased from 11% in 1993 to 14.3% in 1997). On the other hand, another recent study finds "no
compelling evidence of lower profitability at commercial banks that specialize in home purchase
lending in lower-income neighborhoods or to lower-income borrowers," which could be interpreted as
a demonstration that the CRA does not impose a heavy burden. See GLENN CANNER & WAYNE
PASSMORE, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND THE PROFITABILITY OF MORTGAGE-ORIENTED
BANKS I (Divs. of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and
Economics Discussion Paper No. 1997-7, 1999).
30
See Scott Bamacik, Fed Governor: Study CRA To See if it Works, AM. BANKER, June 4,
1999, at 2; Marc Selinger, Gramlich Urges More Research on Impact of Community Reinvestment Act,
BNA NEWS, June 7, 1999, at D4 (reporting on speech by Federal Reserve Governor Edward Gramlich
noting the dearth of empirical research on the effects of the CRA).
31
For a survey of the state of American cities noting recent signs of improvement, see
America's Cities: They Can Yet Be Resurrected, ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 1998, at 17 [hereinafter
America's Cities].
32
See, e.g., Schlesinger & Schroeder, supra note 29 ("During [President Clinton's] first six
years in office, about $1 trillion in private loan and investment commitments were made to lowerincome homeowners and small businesses under the [CRA]. That ranks CRA as perhaps the country's
biggest urban-development program ever.").
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have declined considerably since 1980, with the prime rate falling from
15% to roughly 8%. Unemployment has declined over the same period
from 7% to 4.2%. Wealthy individuals have shifted money out of bank

accounts and into mutual funds, forcing banks to seek.deposits from less
wealthy customers.33 Lower income borrowers have emerged in recent
34

years as the fastest growing segment of the home mortgage market.
Mortgage companies have competed with banks for the most attractive
lending prospects, forcing banks to seek business in markets they had
initially ignored. Big-city mayors typically are more interested in
management today than in the 1970s and early '80s, and this has
encouraged businesses to stay in or relocate to the cities improving, in
turn, the prospects for lending in depressed inner cities.35 Any rigorous
assessment of the CRA should control for these and other factors in
attempting to measure the impact of the CRA on inner-city development.
Since the passage of the CRA, Congress has enacted one other statute
that can be described as having economic development lending as its

major goal. The Community Development Financial Institutions Act of
199436 created the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI)
fund, which is housed in the Treasury Department. 7 The CDFI fund was
initially authorized to spend $382 million over four years on CDFIs, 38
whose goal is to provide credit to poor people who lack access to the

services of conventional financial institutions. Most CDFIs concentrate on
financing low-income housing, others provide consumer credit and small
business loans. 39 The CDFI program is quite different from the CRA, in
the sense that the former aims solely to subsidize development lending.40
Regardless of whether these regulatory efforts have improved, or will
33
On this process, known as "disintermediation," see JAMES L. PIERCE, THE FuTURE OF
BANKING 5-9 (1991).
34
See John R. Wilke, Giving Credit: Mortgage Lending to Minorities Shows a Sharp 1994
Increase, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1996, at Al.
35
See America's Cities, supra note 31, at 19.
36
12 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4718 (1994) (enacted as Title I of the Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act). For an overview of the Community Development
Financial Institutions Act, see Calvin Cunningham, How Banks Can Benefit from Partnership with
Community Development Financial Institutions: The Bank Enterprise Awards Program, 2 N.C.
BANKING INST. 261 (1999); and Robert W. Shields, Community Development Financial Institutions
and the Community Development Financial Institutions Act of 1994: Good Ideas in Need of Some
Attention, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 637, 652-61 (1998).

37
See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 36, at 270.
38
See id. at 269.
39
See generally Banking on the Poor, ECONOMIST, June 27, 1998, at 28.
40
I have argued elsewhere that subsidization of development lending is desirable and
probably the best approach to encouraging such lending. See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 1, at 28286. A more difficult question is the precise form subsidization should take. For an argument that a
direct subsidy to existing banks would have been preferable to the CDFI machinery, see generally
David E. Runck, An Analysis of the Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act
and the Problem of "Rational Redlining" Facing Low-Income Communities, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING
L. 517 (1996).
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improve, matters, it remains important to understand the link between
lending and economic development in cities. Understanding this link is
critical to finding a superior alternative to the existing set of developmentoriented statutes. Economic conditions can change for the worse, reversing
the new positive trends in development. Moreover, pressures for
minimum-wage legislation and living-wage ordinances threaten to restrict
access to the job market for many poor urban residents. In view of these
risks, it is important to understand the imperfections in the market for
development lending and the ways in which regulatory statutes may
worsen these imperfections.
II.

The Economics of Development Lending in the Inner Cities

The concepts of discrimination and asymmetric information have
provided competing theories to explain inadequacy in development
lending. The literature on inner-city development lending, and specifically
on the CRA, makes heavy use of theoretical work on the economics of
discrimination, in order to justify statutes regulating bank lending.41
Development economists, on the other hand, tend to focus on asymmetric
information theories in explaining the lack of bank lending to the poor in
developing countries.42
Discrimination theory attributes low levels of bank lending to a
process in which racial information plays an important role. Racial
information enters the lending process in two ways: the lender relies on
information regarding the loan applicant's race in assessing the
creditworthiness of the prospective borrower, or the lender is concerned
with the racial environment surrounding the final use of the loan. 43 For
example, the latter type of discrimination occurs when the lender is
reluctant to lend to an applicant of any race who plans to use the loan to
purchase a home or set up a business in a minority neighborhood.
Since the seminal work of Gary Becker,44 discrimination theorists
have distinguished two types of discrimination. One, "taste-based" (or
irrational) discrimination, assumes that discrimination occurs because the
discriminating actor experiences some disutility from associating with the
group he dislikes. 45 The other, statistical (or rational) discrimination,
41

See, e.g., Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 1, at 253-62; Swire, supra note 1, at 814-29.

42

See, e.g., DEBORAH RAY, DEVELOPMENT EcONOMICS 540 (1998). To be sure, the CRA

literature includes some discussions of the asymmetric information theory. See, e.g., Hylton &
Rougeau, supra note 1, at 258-59; Klausner, supra note 1, at 1566-68. However, most of these
discussions mention the asymmetric information theory as one of several plausible explanations for
sub-optimal lending patterns in inner cities.
See, e.g., Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 1, at 253.
43
44

GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d. ed. 1971).

45

See id. at 16-17.
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assumes that the actor treats the distinguishing characteristic of the
disfavored group (e.g., race, ethnicity, language) as a signal of poor
reliability, low ability, or some other unfavorable trait.46
Asymmetric information theory focuses on the lender's inability to
assess the creditworthiness of a particular applicant or the risk propensity
of the applicant's intended use for the loan. Race may play a role in this
inability to assess risk, but it is not a necessary feature of the theory.
Lending shortfalls due to asymmetric information may be observed in a
market in which all parties are of the same race. The asymmetric
information theory posits that the lender, in response to his inability to
assess risk, sets a single interest rate that is below the level he would
charge to the riskiest borrower in the applicant pool and rations credit to
applicants.4 Credit rationing takes the form of a refusal either to lend as
much as some loan applicants would like or to lend at all to some
applicants to cap the total credit available.
Both the discrimination and asymmetric information theories can
explain why race creates a difficulty for the lender in correctly assessing
the risk associated with a particular loan. The theories also provide
competing explanations for systemic racial inequities. Under the statistical
discrimination theory, the lender uses information on race as a proxy for
information on risk that would be difficult to gather. Thus, statistical
discrimination occurs as a response to informational asymmetry in this
version of the discrimination theory. Although it is not difficult to think of
scenarios in which discrimination and asymmetric information theories
both seem to fit the facts-indeed, I hope to show that the two theories
provide a better account of the lending problems in inner cities when they
are combined in a synthesis-it is important to note that they have
different policy implications. Discrimination theories assume that race
plays a pivotal role in the lending process, whereas asymmetric
information theory makes information itself the key variable. While
discrimination theories lead to policies that seek to reduce or eliminate
racial information as a factor in the lending process, asymmetric
information theory suggests policies that seek primarily to reduce
informational disparities in lending.
I will depart from the general approach of the community
reinvestment literature by applying asymmetric information theory to the
problems of development lending in cities. Following the development
46
See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
659 (1973).
47
See, e.g., RAY, supra note 42, at 532.
48
See id. at 553-55; K.N. Raj, Keynesian Economics and Agrarian Economics, in
REFLECTIONS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF V.K.iXV.
RAO, at 102, 113-18 (C.H.H. Rao & P.C. Joshi eds., 1979); Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 2.
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literature, I will use the term "formal sector" to refer to banks, savings
institutions, and other traditional financial intermediaries.4 9 I envisage a
lending market that consists of formal sector lenders, such as banks, that
operate in the clear sight of the authorities (creating records for tax

purposes) and informal sector lenders, consisting of currency exchange
outlets, pawn shops, loan sharks, friends and relatives. Sub-prime lenders
sit in a special place in this description because they serve as bridges
between the informal and formal sectors. Sub-prime lenders serve
customers who typically can obtain loans only from an informal sector

lender,5° but they also create credit records in some cases that can be used
by the borrower to propel himself into the class of applicants deemed
creditworthy by formal sector lenders.
A.

Asymmetric Information, Segregation,and Lending

I will start with the problem of assessing borrower creditworthiness,
and then move on to consider small business and residential lending.5' I
restrict my focus to the problems associated with bank lending for
development purposes. Low-income people have access to other sources of

credit, such as sub-prime lenders and credit cards. However, these sources
of credit are available for consumption purposes rather than small-business
development5

2

I have adopted the implicit assumption that community

development lending means lending primarily for businesses, and
secondarily for homes.

1.

Borrower Creditworthiness and the Transparency Problem

As many have noted, the market for lending has changed from one of

relationship banking to an impersonal one dominated by credit-scoring
models.53 As a result, it has become important for credit applicants to be
49
See RAY, supra note 42, at 532; Jameel Jaffer, Microfinance and the Mechanics of
Solidarity Lending: Improving Access to Credit Through Innovations in Contract Structure 6 (1999)
(unpublished Harvard Law and Economics discussion paper on file with author).
50
Two of the biggest sub-prime lenders in the U.S. are Green Tree Financial, a Minnesota
firm that specializes in mortgages for mobile homes, and The Money Store. Many large banks and
insurers have purchased sub-prime lenders and use them to service customers with poor credit
histories. Green Tree Financial was recently purchased by Conseco, a large insurer, and The Money
Store was recently purchased by First Union, a large bank. See Sub-Prime Lenders: Trailer Trashed,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1998, at 56, 56-57.
51
For an insightful analysis of micro-lending in developing countries, see Jaffer, supra note
49. My discussions of borrower creditworthiness and business lending below have attempted to extend
Jaffer's analysis to the problem of lending in inner cities.
52
This is obviously true in the case of credit cards. Sub-prime lenders, though a source of
lending targeted to people with poor credit histories, focus on consumption loans, such as the purchase
of a car. Sub-prime lenders typically do not extend loans to finance start-up businesses.
53
See, e.g., Peter Hurst, The Guide to Credit Scoring, CREDIT MGMT., Oct. 1998, at 33, 33
("One of the greatest changes in the consumer credit world in the last 20 years has been the

Banks and Inner Cities
able to adequately answer standard form questions, in order satisfy the
demands of the modem mechanized process.54 Being able to provide
verifiable answers to such questions makes a borrower transparent in the
eyes of lenders. Transparency, therefore, has become an asset to
applicants. Since the cost of processing his application will be low, a
transparent applicant will be able to shop among competing lenders to find
the best terms. Applicants who can achieve this transparency are better off
today than in the days of relationship banking. Non-transparent applicants,
however, have been unable to take advantage of the benefits of
mechanized lending, and this has special implications for disadvantaged
residents of inner cities. 5
Low-income residents of inner-city communities often cannot meet
the transparency demands of the modem lending process, due to poverty
and associated ills.5 6 The most important handicap for many of these
applicants is the existence of a poor credit history, or the absence of a
credit history. For example, only forty-five percent of black households
maintain checking accounts, compared to eighty percent of white
households.5 7 Many of the minority residents in depressed inner-city areas
carry out all of their transactions in cash. Rather than dealing with banks,
they go to local currency exchange outlets or local convenience and liquor
stores to convert checks into cash. In the course of doing so, they typically
pay a large share, as much as fifteen to twenty-five percent of the check, to
a cashier.5 8 Without a financial record, a bank without a relationship with
the loan applicant will find it hard to assess the applicant's history in
repaying loans.
Employment instability is another factor explaining the poor credit
histories of low-income residents in cities. Unemployment rates are higher
for minorities, particularly in large metropolitan areas. 9 Layoffs and job
replacement of manual judgmental credit assessment with credit scoring techniques."). J.P. Morgan,
for example, has recently decided to cease relationship lending to large corporations. See Bankless
Banking, ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1998, at 56, 56.

54
See, e.g., Jaffer, supranote 49, at 6-7.
55
Several years ago, former Federal Reserve Board Governor Lawrence B. Lindsey called
attention to the fact that increased use of credit scoring models had the unintended consequence of
making it more difficult for low-income applicants to receive loans. See Lawrence B. Lindsey, Real
Progress Without Unintended Consequences, Address Before the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland's
Community Reinvestment Forum 9-10 (Sept. 25, 1993) (transcript on file with author).
56
For a more in-depth discussion on the topic of inner-city poverty, see John D. Kasarda,
Inner-City Concentrated Poverty and NeighborhoodDistress: 1970 to 1990, 4 HouS. POL'Y DEBATE
253 (1993) (describing characteristics of distressed neighborhoods within the nation's 100 largest
central cities); and Edwin Mills'et al., Inner Cities, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 727, 748-50 (1997) (comparing
income, education, and poverty statistics between suburbs and inner cities for whites and blacks).
57
See Peter P. Swire, Equality of Opportunity and Investment in Creditworthiness,143 U.
PA. L. REV. 1533, 1536 (1995) (citing figures from 1989).
58
See Consumer Finance: Pay Dirt, ECONOMIST, June 5, 1999, at 28, 28.
59
See, e.g.,
GERALD DAVID JAYNES & ROBIN M. WILLIAMS JR., A COMMON DESTINY:
BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 319-23 (1989) (discussing access to jobs in high-poverty urban
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dismissals occur more frequently for these groups. 60 This results in poor
credit histories, because of the general lack of wealth in the form of
savings, inherited money, or home equity.
There are other problems associated with employment instability and
lack of legitimate-sector employment. Some loan applicants who cannot
demonstrate a sound credit history can at least make up for it by
demonstrating a stable employment history. For individuals with unstable
employment histories, and for those who rely on a combination of welfare
payments and informal sector work, there is little to show in this regard.
The lack of legitimate-sector employment also reduces the likelihood that
such an applicant will find a guarantor for a loan needed to set up a
business.
These handicaps are all magnified by the problem of racial
61
segregation, or "hypersegregation," as Massey and Denton describe it.
African-American city residents are segregated to an extent far beyond that
observed among other racial and ethnic groups in America,62 which
amplifies differences in the incidence of poverty in white and black urban
neighborhoods.63 In the Chicago area, for example, four out of five poor
areas); John D. Kasarda, Urban Change and Minority Opportunities,in THE NEW URBAN REALITY 5758 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985) (discussing unemployment rates of central-city males between 1969
and 1982 and noting that, in 1982, the central-city unemployment rate was 9.5% for white males and
23.4% for black males). One commonly offered reason for the higher unemployment rate for
minorities in cities is the movement of businesses out of cities. On the "spatial mismatch" between the
locations of jobs and city residents, see Harry J. Holzer, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What Has
the Evidence Shown?, 28 URB. STUD. 105 (1991); John Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro
Employment and MetropolitanDecentralization,82 Q.J. ECON. 175 (1968); and Steven Raphael, Interand Intra-Ethnic Comparisonsof the CentralCity-Suburban Youth Employment Differential: Evidence
from the Oakland Metropolitan Area, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 505 (1998) (comparing
unemployment rates in downtown and suburban Oakland). For a survey of the empirical literature on
racial differences in employment, see Harry J. Holzer, Black Employment Problems: New Evidence,
Old Questions, 13 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 699 (1994).
60
See Francine D. Blau & John W. Graham, Black-White Differences in Wealth and Asset
Composition, 105 Q.J. ECON. 321, 327-30 (1990) (arguing that blacks have less wealth than whites,
and blacks living in cities have less wealth on average).
61
See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 74 (1993)
(defining five types, or "dimensions," of segregation and noting that African Americans are both more
segregated than other groups on any single dimension of segregation and more segregated on all
dimensions simultaneously, a pattern they describe as "hypersegregation"). Anticipating the work of
Massey and Denton, William Julius Wilson has emphasized the multiplying effect of concentrated
poverty among the urban poor. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 56-58 (1987) (discussing concentration effects that tend
to multiply harmful consequences of poverty). For an excellent survey of the state of the cities and
low-income urban residents, see Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions,
71 N.C. L. REV. 1351 (1993).
62
See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 61, at 74-78. On the economic implications of
hypersegregation, see generally David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, Are Ghettos Good or Bad?,
112 Q.J. ECON. 827 (1997) (concluding that blacks in more segregated areas have significantly worse
outcomes than blacks in less-segregated areas).
63
To illustrate, suppose that, in a particular city, the poverty rate among whites is 10% and
the poverty rate among blacks is 30%. If the city were perfectly integrated, with equal numbers of
whites and blacks, the poverty rate in every sector would be 20%. However, if the city is perfectly
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whites live in mixed-income areas, compared to only one in five poor
blacks.64 This has several implications for access to credit.
First, the most important informal sector credit source,65 loans from
friends and relatives, is effectively unavailable. Friends and family
members are unlikely to have money to lend, and the whole notion of an
informal network of borrowing would seem foreign in many poor,
hypersegregated communities. Informal lending networks require some
informational infrastructure.66 Potential borrowers need to know who to
approach for a loan, as well as the reputation of the lender for sticking to
the terms of his bargain. Informal lenders, on the other hand, need
information on the reliability and trustworthiness of borrowers, as well as
on the likelihood that informal sanctions, such as ostracism or refusals of
others to lend, will be applied to those who refuse to repay their loans.67
,However, in a community in which few lending sources are available and
few individuals seek loans for business purposes, the flow of lending may
be too small to support such an informational infrastructure. 68
segregated, the poverty rate is (obviously) 10% in the white area and 30% in the black area. To get a

sense of the how this differential in poverty incidence translates into experience, note that this implies
that within the black sector, 100% of the residents live either next door or two doors down from a poor
household, while in the white sector, only 20% live within two doors of a poor household. On
segregation and the concentration of poverty, see MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 61, at 118-25.
64
See Urban Planning: A Windy City for the Next Century, ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 1999, at
26, 26 (discussing the "Chicago Metropolis 2020" report issued by the Commercial Club of Chicago).
65
On the importance of informal financing for small business, see Philip Bond & Robert
Townsend, Formal and Informal Financing in a Chicago Ethnic Neighborhood, 20 ECON. PERSP. 3,

15-17 (1996) (reporting findings that bank financing is seldom used and that only a minority of
businesses in this survey used any kind of loan).
66
See RAY, supra note 42, at 556-57 (discussing the need for default information to be
transmitted among lenders in an informal lending market).
67
See id; see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (finding that as diamond traders

become more ethnically heterogeneous, they rely increasingly on formal sanctions to enforce
agreements); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi
Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989); Janet Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous
Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 439, 439-62

(1981) (arguing that, in the absence of developed legal enforcement mechanisms, traders deal within
ethnically homogeneous circles in order to access information on the reliability of potential partners);
Kandori Michihiro, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 63 (1992).
68
Evidence supports the hypothesis that more-segregated groups have greater difficulty

forming informal lending networks. A recent study reports that black business owners start their
businesses with significantly less capital than owners from other racial and ethnic groups. See Paul
Huck et al., Small Business Finance in Two Chicago Minority Neighborhoods, 23 ECON. PERSP. 46, 53

(1999) (explaining that "a Black owner with baseline characteristics starts a business with an estimated
56 percent lower level of funding than a comparable Hispanic owner. By comparison, a White owner
starts with 89 percent more funding than a comparable Hispanic; an Asian owner starts with 118
percent more ....
").
Although the differences in start-up funding are in part attributable to personal
wealth, they also result from informal loans. In particular, the gap between black and Hispanic start-up
funding seems to be largely due to differences in access to informal loans. See id. at 53-54 (explaining
that the "results... show that the difference between personal funding provided by Black and Hispanic
owners is small and statistically insignificant both for businesses started from scratch and businesses
bought or acquired").
An alternative view on the effects of informal financing is suggested by Robert W. Fairlie, The
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Second, because of hypersegregation, Black and some Hispanic
inner-city residents are often denied access to the informal networks that
reduce the cost of risk assessment for formal sector lenders.
Hypersegregation increases the difficulty on the part of a bank loan officer
in assessing risk, for the loan officer is unlikely to be from the same
neighborhood as the applicant or to know anyone from the neighborhood. 69
If the loan officer were from the same neighborhood or knew a
neighborhood resident, he could contact people he trusted for information,
but this option is unavailable as a practical matter because of
hypersegregation.
To gather personal information on the reliability of a minority
applicant, the loan officer may have to find sources of information on the
applicant from the applicant's neighborhood and question these sources
about his creditworthiness. This would be an expensive undertaking, with
an uncertain payoff. Given that the loan officer is unlikely to know anyone
who knows the information sources, he cannot easily verify their
reliability. Moreover, because the information sources are unlikely to have
repeat dealings with the loan officer, they would have, at best, weak
incentives to protect their own reputations for providing reliable
information. The rational response of the loan officer is to discount heavily
word-of-mouth reports from these information sources. Thus, loan
applicants from hypersegregated urban communities will be discriminated
against in the creditworthiness assessment process, in the sense that they
will be burdened with the greatest informational demands and the highest
rejection probabilities.7 °
2.

Small Business Lending, Segregation, and Risk Control

To this point of the Article, I have considered the difficulty a formalsector bank faces in assessing borrower creditworthiness when the
applicant comes from a hypersegregated urban community. The
difficulties are just as severe when the bank tries to assess the potential
profits of a proposed business start-up. One might think initially that
Absence of the African-American Owned Business: An Analysis of the Dynamics of Self-Employment,
17 J. LAB. ECON. 80 (1999). Fairlie finds that racial differences in asset levels and probabilities of
having self-employed fathers explain a large part (roughly 30%) of the gap between black and white
rates of entry into self-employment, though none of the gap in exit rates. See id. at 80, 96-97.
69
For observations on the importance of local information in the lending process and the
constraint imposed by segregation, see Taibi, supranote 1, at 1482-83.
70
For empirical evidence that black-owned firms have greater difficulty in obtaining loans
from commercial banks, see Timothy Bates, Commercial Bank Financingof White- and Black-Owned
Small Business Start-Ups, 31 Q. REV. ECON. & BuS. 64 (1991) (finding that black-owned firms
receive smaller loans than white-owned firms possessing identical measured characteristics). For a
report on studies finding discrimination in small business lending, see Jeffery A. Tannenbaum, Small
Business Lenders Rebuff Blacks, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1999, at A2.
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business projects are easier to evaluate for risk assessment purposes than
the creditworthiness of a particular borrower. But this is not at all clear.
Even when the prospective borrower claims to have no special information
about the project's prospects that the lender does not, the lender must still
worry about the creditworthiness of the borrower. Put another way, even if
the project itself is without risk, borrower risk is unavoidable, for the
borrower could at any time abscond with the money. Given this, all of the
information barriers generated by hypersegregation exist to make small
business lending difficult within most poor urban communities.
Setting aside the issue of borrower risk, hypersegregation also makes
it difficult to assess the risks associated with a start-up business.7 1 If the
business relies, as small businesses typically do, on local consumption
patterns, the labor-market skills of local residents, the reliability of local
input providers, and other features of the community in which the
borrower lives or intends to run the business, then it would be difficult for
a loan officer to assess independently the prospective borrower's claims. 2
These problems suggest that business-project risk adds to, rather than
reduces, the level of difficulty for a bank assessing the risk of lending in a
hypersegregated market.
Stiglitz and Weiss's influential work on credit rationing demonstrates
that, in the presence of informational asymmetry, a lender will ration
credit.7 ' The lender cannot price discriminate by charging higher interest
rates to riskier applicants, because the borrowers are observationally
indistinguishable. Moreover, the lender will not set the rate at the level he
would charge the riskiest class of applicants and let all applicants borrow
as much as they want, because this would generate adverse selection, in
which the worst risks seek loans. The rate that would have been
appropriate ex ante for any particular class of loan recipient will turn out to
be too low, ex post, given the higher selection rate among the riskiest
members of that class. The lender's optimal policy in this setting may be
one in which he charges a rate that effectively pools low- and high-risk
borrowers. The lender also limits his exposure by restricting the total
amount loaned and the amount each applicant can borrow. This policy
creates a shortage in the credit market, since the demand for loans will
exceed the supply.
There are methods a lender can use to limit risk and thereby meet the
71

This is consistent with the evidence that debt capital is harder to obtain when the

borrowing business is black-owned and located in an urban minority community. See Timothy Bates,
The Changing Nature of Minority Business: A Comparative Analysis of Asian, Nonminority, and
Black-Owned Businesses, 18 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 24, 40 (1989).

72
It would be worth noting that this loan officer has neither information regarding nor
informal contacts with residents of the community.
73
See Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 2, at 402-406; see also RAY, supra note 42, at 546;
Jaffer, supra note 49, at 8.
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excess demand for loans. The lender can gather additional information on
applicants, but I have assumed that this is extremely costly because of
segregation. Specifically, I assume that the incremental cost of obtaining
additional information on the loan applicant exceeds the incremental
benefit to the lender. Another approach the lender can use to limit risk in
the presence of asymmetric information is to require collateral. Collateral
sometimes has the effect of controlling or mitigating the adverse selection
problem, and has the further advantage of aligning the incentives of the
borrower with those of the lender.
Collateral can limit the adverse selection problem by making the
lender's terms less attractive to borrowers with the riskiest business
plans.74 Consider the case of a borrower who is not required to provide
collateral, who does not intend to repay the loan if his project fails, and
who is judgment-proof with respect to the amount borrowed. In the
absence of collateral, such a borrower with a risky project will compare
the project's payoff in the best state to the amount that must be repaid on
the loan. If the best-state payoff exceeds the amount due, he will consider
the loan worthwhile, even if he would be unable to repay it in the worst
state. The borrower is unconcerned with the worst-state scenario because
he intends to walk away from the loan in that event. Such a borrower
would be willing to accept a loan with an interest rate so high that it would
be unprofitable ex ante to a borrower who intended to repay the loan
whatever the outcome. A collateral requirement would reduce this
borrower's willingness to accept the lender's terms by introducing some
downside risk to the borrower in the worst state. The borrower will
demand a larger payoff in the best state to compensate for the downside
risk and, to secure this, will demand a lower rate of interest on the loan.
Hence, collateral can* serve as a screen against borrowers with extremely
risky plans.
Incentive alignment mitigates the problem of "moral hazard," the
tendency of a borrower to fail to take steps to maximize the likelihood that
he will repay the loan. A standard problem discussed in the literature on
bankruptcy is the incentive of the debtor-in-possession to adopt risky
projects. 75 The debtor-in-possession has this incentive because he has
nothing to lose, and can only gain by winning in a big way with the
financial equivalent of a "Hail Mary" pass for a touchdown in the waning
seconds of a football game. The same incentive is observed after a
borrower has taken loan money and faces a choice to take or to avoid a
74

See STEFANIA COSCI, CREDIT RATIONING AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 29, 39-42

(1993); Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 2, at 402.
75

See, e.g., DOUGLAS BAIRD & THOMAS JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS IN

BANKRUPTCY 756 (2d ed. 1990) ("The debtor then has an incentive to incur large debts or undertake
riskier activities, because of the minimum level of protection the law provides.").
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risky decision that could increase the project's profitability.76 If the
borrower effectively owes nothing if he fails to make enough from the
project to repay the loan, he will have an incentive to make "Hail Mary"
decisions after the loan has been extended. Under certain conditions,
collateral has the effect of dampening this incentive and encouraging the
borrower to make decisions that are actuarially safer,77 in the sense that they
increase the likelihood he will repay the loan in full.
The effect of a collateral requirement on the borrower's incentives
depends on the amount of collateral put at risk and the potential gains to
the borrower from accepting additional risk.7' A collateral requirement
may have perverse incentive effects from the lender's perspective. It may
induce borrowers to choose smaller projects, and if smaller projects have
higher failure probabilities, increasing the collateral requirement may
augment the risk propensity of the lender's portfolio.7 9 Alternatively, if the
project requires later stages of external finance and the lender cannot
credibly commit to refuse to lend in the future, the collateral requirement
may induce the lender to choose a riskier project that requires more
lending in the future. 0 Given the borrower's limited liability, the borrower
may contradict the wishes of the lender after meeting the collateral
requirement by taking an extremely risky decision if the expected gain
from the decision exceeds the expected loss.8
Moreover, as a method of screening risky borrowers, the collateral
requirement may fail. If wealthy individuals generally are willing to take
on riskier projects, a collateral requirement may cause less-wealthy
borrowers to drop out of the market, increasing the risk of the lender's
portfolio. 2 Thus, in order to make the collateral requirement an effective
method of sorting out risky borrowers and influencing borrower
incentives, the lender needs sufficient information to determine whether
the requirement will have the desired screening and incentive effects.
This suggests one route through which hypersegregation may
influence the lender's collateral policy. Given his lack of local
information, the lender will find it difficult to determine the selection and
incentive effects of a collateral requirement. Unable to predict the
incentives created by the collateral requirement, the lender presumably
76
For an illustrative numerical illustration of the incentive-alignment effect, see Jaffer,
supra note 49, at 8-9. For more general discussions, see COSCI, supra note 74, at 42-44; and Stiglitz &
Weiss, supra note 2, at 405-06.
77
See Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 2, at 403.
78
See, e.g., COSCI, supra note 74, 42-44.
79
See Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 2, at 402.
80
See id. at 405.
81
See COSCi, supra note 74, at 43-44 (citing Hildegard C. Wette, Collateral in Credit
Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, Note, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 442 (1983)).
82
See Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 2, at 403-05.
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would use it as a precautionary measure, rather than as a device for
eliminating excess demand. Specifically, if the lender treats failure as an
exogenous event beyond the influence of his contractual terms, he is likely
to use the collateral requirement as a form of insurance, provided he is
risk-averse.83 Such a lender would seek full insurance against the
borrower's failure to repay, reducing the interest rate by an amount
reflecting an implicit insurance premium paid to the borrower.8 4 This
suggests that the lender's collateral demands will be considerably steeper
if based on the precautionary motive.
Whether used as an incentive device or a precautionary measure, a
collateral requirement is likely to be an extreme burden, and often
unaffordable, for relatively poor members of minority groups. The
problem is particularly severe for African-Americans. Although pay levels
have been approaching parity among whites and Blacks in the United
States,85 wealth levels continue to remain far apart.86 The level of collateral
that might be considered reasonable to ask of a white loan applicant could
easily be out of reach for a Black applicant seeking a loan for the same
project and of the same amount. Hypersegregation and associated ills have
implications for the value of collateral as well. A piece of machinery or
personal property will be worth less in terms of expected value if located
in an area where theft or injury to property is a relatively frequent
occurrence.87 If expenditures are required to protect the collateral and the
project goes bad, the lender loses whatever incentive he had initially to
safeguard the value of the collateral. Aware of these problems, the rational
lender would increase the level of collateral demanded, making it less
83
A risk-averse individual would be unwilling to pay 50¢ to enter a lottery promising one
dollar with probability two and zero dollars with probability two. He would demand a lower lottery
price in order to compensate him for his aversion to risk. For an introductory discussion on risk
aversion, see ANDREAU MASS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 185 (2d ed. 1995).
84
This assumes that the implicit insurance premium is set at the competitive or actuarially
fair price. See id. at 187-88 (discussing incentive of risk-averse decision maker to purchase insurance
coverage).
85
See, e.g., RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 535-36 (3d ed. 1988).
86
See Blau & Graham, supra note 60, at 321 (finding that, on average, young black families
hold 18% of the wealth of young white families); Paul L. Menchik & Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos,
Black-White Wealth Inequality: Is Inheritance the Reason?, 35 ECON. INQUIRY 428, 430 (1997)
(reporting that black household wealth averages 20% of white household wealth). Inheritance explains
between 10% and 20% of the average difference in black-white household wealth. See Menchik &
Jianakoplos, supra, at 428; see also Rukmalie Jaykody, Race Differences in Intergenerational
Financial Assistance: The Needs of Children and the Resources of Parents, 19 J. FAM. ISSUES 508,
529-30 (1998) (reporting that the median net worth of an African-American household is $3397,
compared to $39,135 for white households).
87
This is easy to see. Suppose A and B both own cars worth $5000. The probability of theft
in A's neighborhood is 1%, versus 15% in B's area. For someone who plans to take possession of the
car at some future date, the expected value of A's car is (.99)($5000) = $4950, while the expected
value of B's car is (.85)($5000) = $4250. Thus, being located in a high-theft area devalues B's car by
$750.
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likely that the applicant will be able to meet the terms of the lender. As a
result, those applicants who come from the economically bleakest
environments are required to meet the steepest collateral demands.
In sum, the asymmetric information model applied to small business
lending implies that a formal sector lender that services a hypersegregated
community will: (1) ration credit in order to screen out risky applicants,
generating relatively high rejection probabilities; and (2) make relatively
steep collateral demands. Put another way, loan applicants from
hypersegregated communities will be discriminated against in the sense
that they will face higher rejection probabilities and steeper collateral
demands.
3.

Residential Lending, Social Capital, and Segregation

When one examines residential lending in poor urban areas, it
becomes evident that there are informational barriers to residential lending
as steep as those in the business context. First, there again arises the
problem of assessing borrower creditworthiness. This is unavoidable, and
the problems of hypersegregation discussed above make this assessment
difficult for reasons already given. 8 Second, as observed in the case of
project lending with collateral, having an asset that can be repossessed
does not always simplify the task of risk assessment. Instead, factors
associated with poverty and hypersegregation combine to amplify the
informational asymmetry and risk barriers in the residential lending
process.
A house can be decomposed into two assets, one offering a
consumption stream consisting of shelter and privacy, the other a security
that can be transferred at market value to the lender at any moment. In the
latter sense, a home mortgage gives the borrower a type of derivative
known as a "put option." If the value of the security falls below a given
price, the owner of the put option can sell it to the other party at the fixed
strike price. 9 In the home mortgage contract, the relevant .strike price to
88
In applying the asymmetric information model to residential lending, I do not intend to
minimize the historical importance of intentional discrimination in the residential lending market. For a
survey of mortgage-lending discrimination that includes a discussion of the historical evidence of
intentional discrimination, see Michael LaCour-Little, Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: A Critical
Review of the Literature, 7 J. REAL EST. LIT. 15 (1999).
89
A put option on a stock gives the holder of the option the right to sell the stock at a fixed
price. Thus, if the share price falls below the fixed price, the holder of the option will exercise his right
to sell. See, e.g., RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 432-33
(2d ed. 1984). On put options and mortgage contracts, see generally Jimmy Hilliard et al., Valuing
Prepayment and Default in a Fixed Rate Mortgage: A Bivariate Binomial Pricing Technique, 26 REAL
EST. ECON. 431 (1998); and Brent W. Ambrose & Richard J. Buttimer, Jr., Embedded Options in the
Mortgage Contract (1998) (unpublished Univ. of Wisconsin-Milwaukee discussion paper on file with
author).
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the borrower is the outstanding amount of the loan. The borrower has an
incentive to exercise his put option by defaulting on the loan whenever the
market price of the house falls below the outstanding amount of the loan.
Viewing the house as a consumption stream, the lender is largely
concerned with the creditworthiness of the borrower. However, this
assessment is complicated by the effects attributable to the put option
portion of the contract. If the borrower decides to default, he will no longer
have an incentive to take actions that protect the market value of the house.
Hence, a borrower who is less than creditworthy may take actions that
reduce or fail to protect the value of the house after he has decided to
default.
By comparison, a lender viewing the house as a security is concerned
that it will be able to repossess an asset with a market value close to that of
the outstanding loan should the borrower default. Even if the borrower is
creditworthy, the market value of the house may fall, and if it falls
sufficiently far, the borrower will have an incentive to exercise his put
option by defaulting.
As in the case of business lending discussed earlier, poverty and
hypersegregation lead to a result in which the bank rations credit to
residential borrowers. Given that the borrower's liability is limited, high
interest rates will attract applicants with riskier income streams and higher
propensities to default. If the borrowers are observationally
indistinguishable to the lender, a likely result of segregation, and if the
adverse selection effect is sufficiently strong, the lender will prefer to
ration credit rather than raise the interest rate in order to eliminate the
shortage of credit.
Perhaps unlike the business-lending scenario, we have a case in which
the underlying collateral, the house, has a market value that may fall
precipitously. A decline in local property values will induce borrowers to
exercise their put options, which, in turn, may trigger further reductions,
creating a downward cycle. In this sense, the put-option feature of
mortgage contracts introduces an additional degree of variation or
sensitivity in local property values. This effect is amplified by the greater
likelihood that property values will fall below the relevant put-option
strike prices in poor, hypersegregated areas. The lender, therefore, will be
concerned about the future stability of property values in the area in which

the home is located. The problem of assessing local incentives to invest in
property makes this predictive assessment of risk difficult.
I have mentioned the importance, for both informal and formal
lending processes, of local information on borrower trustworthiness, norms
of consumer and labor-market behavior, and informal sanctioning
mechanisms. Such information is a form of "social capital" that a person

usually acquires by being located within a community.
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Robert Putnam has defined social capital as the ability of a
community linked by social relations to discipline individual behavior. 90
For the purposes of this essay, I will treat social capital as information
embedded within a system of norms. Moreover, I will assume that there is
a certain material threshold that must be met before this capital can be said
to exist or to have any value. I noted earlier that information on borrower
creditworthiness and the reliability of lenders is likely to be available only
in communities in which the volume of informal lending is above a certain
threshold, so that failure to follow customary rules can be transmitted
among other potential contracting partners. The same can be said about
information on work opportunities and the reliability of potential
employees. Probably the most harmful effect of hypersegregation is that it
puts relatively poor city residents in communities in which these forms of
social capital are either weak or nonexistent.
Social capital of a particular type plays an important role in the
residential lending market. Lenders obviously are concerned about the
incentives of mortgagees to maintain the value of a parcel. But those
incentives depend on the behavior of others. The borrower (or
homeowner) will have relatively weak incentives to make investments in
maintaining and improving his property when any of the following three
conditions exist: first, the home is located in an area where a large
percentage of families have dissolved; second, few residents have an
ownership interest in their residences; and third, a relatively low state of
public order pervades the neighborhood.
To illustrate, one would have weak incentives at best to repaint a
home if the probability that it would be defaced by graffiti were
significant. In addition, one's incentives to maintain property are
dampened to the extent that other homeowners have weak incentives. If
other homeowners are not maintaining their property, it makes little sense
financially for you to maintain yours, given that prices will be depressed
by the general state of disrepair. This disincentive should be stronger,
90

See ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN

ITALY 167, 169 (1993). The general notion of social capital has started to take center-stage in analyses
of many policy issues. Edward Banfield's study of culture in a poor Italian town is considered one of
the early contributions. See EDWARD G. BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY

(1958). Among economists, Glenn Loury is probably the first theorist to rely on the notion of social
capital in explaining the inter-generational transfer of wealth and social status. See Glenn C. Loury, A
Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences, in WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 153 (Phyllis A. Wallace & Annette M. LaMond eds., 1977); Glenn C. Loury,
IntergenerationalTransfers and the Distribution of Earnings, 49 ECONOMETRICA 843 (1981). There
have been several recent contributions to the social-capital literature. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA,
TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995); DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) (emphasizing the

importance of trust and low-cost enforcement mechanisms for economic growth); Shelly Lundberg &
Richard Startz, On the Persistence of Racial Inequality, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 292 (1998) (comparing
community human capital and individual human capital).
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everything else the same, in poor communities where relatively few own
their residences.
I am using the term social capital now to refer generally to
neighborhood public goods-actions undertaken by residents that provide
benefits to others living in the area. Investing in property is one such good,
because it enhances the attractiveness of surrounding parcels. Efforts to
maintain safe streets and to monitor the quality of local publicly provided
goods, such as education and law enforcement, also fall in this category.
Each of these services has the peculiar quality that it is provided in
adequate quantity only when there is an equilibrium in which few residents
"defect" by failing to provide their share; once defection becomes the
norm, no resident has an incentive to provide the service. I have already
given the example of property maintenance. Consider safety in the streets.
Once residents regard the streets as unsafe, no law-abiding resident will
have an incentive to wander outside and, once this state is reached, the
only people likely to be wandering outside will be those intending to
commit a crime. Consider also the quality of local schools. Should a
community lose faith in the quality of the schools, residents who are
concerned about the education of their children will take their children out
of the local schools, further diminishing the overall worth of the education
system. What these examples are intended to suggest is that social capital
is often fragile. Changes in conditions affecting the supply of
neighborhood public goods can lead to herding behavior 9' and selffulfilling prophecies.
Coordination problems, herding, and self-fulfilling prophecies have
been offered as reasons banks may be stuck in a bad equilibrium, in which
no bank has an incentive to lend within a certain community but it would
be profitable for them if all banks were to lend.92 I have emphasized social
capital at the level of individual production of neighborhood public goods,
because there are many low-level, continual investments that can be made
without calling on the help of a bank. Coordination problems can arise
with respect to these investments.9 3 In order to maintain some types of
91
By herding, I mean the tendency of individuals to base their conduct in part on what they
see others doing. Herding is rational in an environment in which each individual assumes (correctly)
that he has only limited information, and can obtain more information by observing the behavior of
others. Rational herding is clearly relevant in explaining the decisions of people to move into or out of
certain neighborhoods. On rational herding generally, see A. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herding
Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992); and David Scharfstein & Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and
Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465 (1990).
92
See, e.g., Hylton & Rougeau, supra note I, at 257-58; Swire, supra note 1, at 822; see
also Klausner, supra note 1, at 1571 (discussing the tendency of banks to follow lending decisions of
their rivals as contributing to investment declines in depressed communities).
93
Take the simple case of enhancing safety within a community through a "neighborhood
watch" program. To the extent such a plan requires participating members to supply a public goodsafety-it is vulnerable to individually-rational shirking by participants in the plan.
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social capital within a community, given the probable necessity of these
cheaper, continuous investments, it would be rational for a bank to make
some assessment of the state of these investments before committing itself
to lend within that community. For this reason, I am inclined to treat
coordination issues with respect to social capital, specifically the private
production of public goods, as a more important factor explaining underinvestment than coordination issues among banks.
The incentive of a mortgagee to default, i.e., to exercise his put
option, depends to some extent on the social capital of the community in
which he is located. This social capital, in turn, is a function of poverty
and hypersegregation. The social capital factor presents both an
informational obstacle and an opportunity to prospective formal lenders.
The formal lender will have difficulty assessing risk: a loan officer who
has no connection to a particular community will rely on general and
stereotypical descriptions of the environment. However, the lender can
make investments to enhance social capital. The lender can coordinate
with other lenders to extend credit to areas in order to support development
efforts undertaken by residents or counsel and provide services to
borrowers in order to encourage local development. But these efforts are
costly and have uncertain payoffs.94
These statements do not imply a moral or value judgment about
communities with social capital that is weaker in the sense considered
here. Such a judgment is unnecessary and irrelevant. More importantly,
however, there is no clear reason to say on moral grounds that the
existence of weak social capital in a community implies that there is
something morally at fault with its residents. The incentives that motivate
residents to provide some neighborhood public goods are sometimes
exclusionary, as in the case of large-lot zoning. Competition for social
status motivates residents to make certain investments in their property.
The moral implications of these incentives are ambiguous at best, and
some thoughtful critics have argued that they lead to wasteful
expenditures." However, whatever the moral implications, competition for
social status is not entirely wasteful if it enhances the provision of public
goods.

94
Indeed, one important cost to the lender is the additional risk he incurs by investing in
social capital. Although the lender's strategy may reduce the risk premium on a typical loan, it also
leads to an increase in the amount of capital put at risk. For further discussion of social capital
investment and risk, see infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
95
See. e.g., ROBERT FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE
QUEST FOR STATUS (1985); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of
Group Status Productionand Race Discrimination,108 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1007-08 (1995) (stating
that discrimination results from competition for social status); Richard H. McAdams, Relative
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1,48-59 (1992).
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Summing Up

The asymmetric information theory developed so far arguably is
superior to the alternative theories of market failure based on
discrimination models. This theory yields predictions that are consistent
with observations in the lending market and also avoids some of the
difficulties attending the discrimination theories. For example, consider the
theory of irrational or taste-based discrimination. This theory is vulnerable
to the critique that competition should provide a cure to the problem.96
Given the scale of the underinvestment problem in poor urban
communities, the taste-based discrimination theory would imply the
existence of enormous profit opportunities that lending institutions were
consistently overlooking, and this seems implausible. 97 Moreover, banks
that consistently avoid profitable lending opportunities, because of tastebased discrimination, would suffer in the competitive process relative to
non-discriminating banks. The asymmetric information theory, however, is
not vulnerable to the competition critique. There is nothing to guarantee
that competition will reduce the credit-rationing problem; indeed,
competition may exacerbate the problem as lenders try more strenuously to
screen out bad risks.98
Consider also the statistical or rational discrimination theory. As I
noted earlier, the statistical discrimination theory can be synthesized with
the asymmetric information theory, a process that I have attempted to
undertake in much of the preceding discussion. However, if we consider
the two theories separately, it seems that the asymmetric information
theory has the advantage. First, the statistical discrimination theory may
lead to the prediction that the lending market is one hundred percent
economically efficient, which is a troubling implication given the obvious
waste of resources observed in poor urban communities. To avoid the
efficiency result, one must allow for the possibility that statistical
discrimination adversely affects the incentives of potential borrowers (e.g.,
diluting the incentive to appear creditworthy) or results in an inferior
coordination equilibrium among lenders. 99 But both of these arguments
strain believability at times. The fundamental flaw in both arguments is
See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 1,at 254.
96
97
See id.; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1,at 308-09 (questioning the assumption
that banks consistently would overlook local profit opportunities).
See J. Miguel Villas-Boas & Udo Schmidt-Mohr, Oligopoly with Asymmetric
98
Information: Differentiation in Credit Markets, 30 RAND J. ECON. 375, 375 (1999) ("[W]ith more
differentiation (less competition), banks may screen credit applicants less intensively in equilibrium
because they compete less aggressively for the most profitable customer. As a result, welfare may rise
as competition becomes less intense.").
99
See, e.g., Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 1, at 254-59 (reviewing theory of statistical
discrimination in application to credit markets). Swire argues that victims of lending discrimination
will not invest as much in creditworthiness. See Swire, supra note 57, at 1537-41 & nn.39-40.
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that they put too much emphasis on the role played by formal lenders in
the formation of social capital and individual patterns of conduct.
B.

Possible Solutions:A Model of Inner-City Development Lending

To this point, I have described the information-related risk barriers to
development lending in inner cities. In this section, I briefly suggest a
market-based solution. In order to overcome the information obstacles to
bank lending in inner cities, an alternative bank model is desirable and
probably necessary. An ideal development bank should have three goals:
(1) integrating disadvantaged inner-city residents into the formal saving
and lending sector; (2) developing an independent entrepreneurial class;
and (3) encouraging property ownership. The immediate payoff from these
aims is material development, but the enhancement of social capital is
equally important.
1.

Integration

Integration is desirable because it transforms low-income consumers
into transparent risks for credit assessment purposes. This is already being
undertaken, to some extent, by sub-prime lenders. However, sub-prime
lenders cannot carry out this transformation on the same scale as the
banking sector. It is obviously cheaper to establish a financial record by
setting up a bank account than by obtaining a loan from a sub-prime
lender, provided the minimum balance for the account is sufficiently
low.' °° Integration would separate some city, residents from a relatively
unprofitable relationship with currency exchange outlets, though it should
be recognized that the outlets would not disappear. They provide
convenience and access to check-cashing services for consumers with low
savings. Banks typically will not cash a check that exceeds the amount in
the check holder's account balance because the balance serves a source of
collateral for the check.' °1 Indeed, the check-cashing process can be seen
as a temporary loan, for which the bank seeks repayment from the check
writer. If the check writer cannot repay the loan, the bank seeks payment
from the check holder's account. For consumers with low savings, cashing
checks at banks is generally infeasible because their balances will be lower
than the amount they would like to cash. For these consumers, the
100 Several banks have responded to the need to integrate potential consumers by reducing
service fees and minimum balances for accounts. For example, South Shore Bank in Chicago initially
cut service fees and reduced the minimum balance for an account to one dollar. See Rochelle E. Lento,
Community Development Banking Strategy for Revitalizing Our Communities, 27 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 773,785 (1994).

101 This is because of the risk of fraud. I thank George Kaufman for making this point to me
in a conversation.
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currency exchange provides an important service.
Moreover, the currency exchange is sometimes more convenient.
Before ATMs became widespread, the currency exchanges had the
advantage of being open for longer hours than banks, making it easier for
someone who worked to get access to money. In addition, currency
exchange employees exercise discretion in a manner that benefits some
repeat customers. They choose whether to cash a check and will rely on
the information garnered from repeat business and local information on
individuals in the community to determine the likelihood a check is not
fraudulent. In order to separate some consumers from the currency
exchange, an ideal community development bank would have to mimic
some of their functions and adapt to or supplant others. ATMs now make
some basic transactions easy at any hour of the day. However, the currency
exchanges are obviously superior for people who have difficulty meeting
the minimum balance required by a bank and who need to convert a check
into cash immediately. And for some city residents, currency exchanges
are often safer places to deal with money, since the consumer is not alone
on the street. In order to encourage consumers to choose a relationship
with a bank rather than a currency exchange, a bank would have to
replicate these features of the currency exchange. Admittedly, this seems
to go against the dominant trend toward ATMs and the Internet as low-cost
methods of transacting with bank customers. However, to the extent the
Internet makes it easier for banks to co-locate with convenience stores and
liquor stores (common places for urban residents to cash checks), new
technology may enable banks to supplant the currency exchange without
mimicking their methods.'0 2
Needless to say, integration should provide a tremendous upside for
residents of low-income communities. The fact that blacks hold bank
accounts at roughly the half the rate of whites suggests a large potential for
gains to banks and minority city residents.' °3 While savings accounts do
not offer high rates of growth relative to stock-indexed mutual funds, they
are superior to simply holding cash, and an expansion of banking services
may encourage saving. Moreover, many banks offer their customers access
to mutual funds. Minority participation in mutual funds is extremely low, a
fact that has led some commentators to worry that the gap between white
greater
and minority participation rates could fuel a considerably
°4
divergence in wealth levels within the upcoming decades.'
102 For an example of such co-location, see Susan Strom, E-Commerce the Japanese Way;
Ubiquitous ConvenienceStores Branch into Cyberspace,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2000, at B I (discussing
integration of Internet commerce and banking with convenience stores in Japan).
103 See Swire, supra note 57, at 1558.
104 See, e.g., Glenn C. Loury, Opting Out of the Boom; Why More Blacks Don't Invest, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 70. On the divergence in white and black wealth levels, see
Blau & Graham, supra note 60, at 327-30.
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2.

Ownership, Entrepreneurship, and Risk

The long-term benefit from expanding the class of owners and
entrepreneurs is the enhancement of social capital within relatively
impoverished inner-city neighborhoods. Lending is the most obvious
channel through which a bank could contribute to this process because
lending encourages property and business ownership and puts the bank in
contact with owners as a source of information and advice. Greater
property and business ownership should, in turn, enhance incentives to
provide neighborhood public goods.
The connection between entrepreneurship and social capital extends
beyond the production of such traditional neighborhood public goods as
safety and education. One of the key obstacles to informal and formal
lending in inner-city communities is the lack of what I described earlier as
an informational infrastructure. Informal lenders need access to
information on the trustworthiness of borrowers and, in addition,
borrowers need access to information on the reliability of lenders because
informal lending networks typically operate without the threat of legal
sanctions. Formal lenders, such as banks, rely on similar informal
networks for information on prospective borrowers. Such an infrastructure
can be viewed as a form of social capital that requires some minimal level
of lending activity in order to be maintained.
Lending in poor communities requires taking on more risk than is
commonly accepted in the banking industry. Large banks minimize
correlated risks by lending to businesses in different geographical
locations and sectors of the economy. Small business loans made by a
community bank will tend to be geographically concentrated and failure
risks will tend to be correlated. A natural disaster, such as an earthquake, a
local economic shock, like the sharp decline in oil prices in Texas in the
1980s, or a riot, such as the one in South Central Los Angeles after the
Rodney King verdict, could wipe out many local banks and businesses at
the same time. Layoffs by a major area employer could sharply reduce the
demand for the services of many small businesses in a single community.
While these risks are present in affluent areas as well, poor communities
are both more vulnerable and less able to rebound, given the absence of an
informational infrastructure to support informal and formal lending.
However, alternative banking models have shown that it is possible to
lend to relatively poor customers without incurring an unacceptable level
of risk. Community development banks, such as the South Shore Bank of
Chicago and the Southern Development Bancorporation, have coordinated
lending with other development activities undertaken by affiliates within
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their holding companies.'0 5 For example, the Shorebank holding company
includes affiliates specializing in housing development, business
development, job training, and education.10 6 Thus, Shorebank has avoided
the coordination problems that affect the supply of local public goods by
taking a large stake in the development of social capital. 0 7 By taking a
large stake, South Shore effectively captures or "internalizes" a large share
of the external benefits generated by its lending and investment projects.
The general implication of the Shorebank model is that the risk of
development lending can be reduced to a tolerable level by harnessing
local information and by coordinating development activities. Risk
reduction under the Shorebank model entails trading off two types of risk.
Shorebank's coordination efforts reduce the informational risks
attributable to inadequate social capital (informational infrastructure, local
public goods), while increasing the systemic or non-diversified risk that
comes from concentrating resources in one area. An optimal coordination
scheme would require making such tradeoffs until the marginal benefit
from reducing informational risk just equals the marginal cost of
increasing systemic risk.
"Group lending" under the Grameen Bank model suggests another
approach to reducing the risk of development lending. Within this model, I
will also include the rotating credit associations (referred to as "ROSCA")
observed in some ethnic communities. 8 The Grameen Bank operates in
Bangladesh and provides loans to groups, typically consisting of five
borrowers from the same village, under agreements in which all members
of the group are liable for the amount loaned to one member.' 0 9 This
transfers a large part of the risk to the borrower, and the parties themselves
have incentives to monitor the borrower to make sure that he repays the
loan. Moreover, groups will seek out members who are creditworthy,
based on information they have from day-to-day experience in their
communities. The Grameen Bank also provides counseling services to help
borrower groups meet their obligations. Grameen Bank reports repayment
rates of ninety-seven percent,11 0 and programs based on the Grameen Bank
model have had similar results."' More importantly, the evidence suggests
that the lending programs have had an effect on wealth accumulation and
105 For an excellent discussion of the South Shore Bank, the Southern Development
Bancorporation, and other community development banks, see Lento, supra note 100, at 782-99.
106 See id. at 786-88.
107 For a similar point, see Klausner, supra note 1, at 1578-79 (discussing the South Shore
Bank).
108 For an excellent discussion of these associations and their implications for community
development lending, see generally Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 841 (1999).
109 See RAY, supra note 42, at 579; Jaffer, supra note 49, at 18.
110 See Jaffer, supra note 49, at 3.
Ill Seeid. at2.
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behavior. A study by economists Mark Pitt and Shahidur Khandker finds
that the Grameen Bank and similar programs in Bangladesh have led to
significant increases in household expenditure and the probability that
children would be enrolled in school.12
Although the Grameen Bank model has worked in developing
countries, it is unlikely that it could be applied in American cities without
significant modification. Hardly anyone in the city is involved in
agriculture or projects with the relatively short horizons typical of those
financed by the Grameen Bank.1 3 Lending for business projects in cities
involves different issues. The proceeds from harvesting a crop can be used
to pay off a loan within a year. However, start-up businesses need more
time to develop financially, and thus raise obstacles to the monitoring and
self-selection advantages that have made Grameen Bank's program
successful.
For long-term investments, a group lending approach is likely to be
feasible within a closely-knit ethnic community. Proof of this is provided
by the Korean-American community's "keh" system, a rotating credit
association in which the pooled savings of members is loaned to individual
members with business plans. 14 However, in the absence of an
informational infrastructure similar to that underlying the keh system, it is
unlikely that a bank could implement a group lending plan within any
randomly selected poor community. 1 5 If the sanctioning mechanisms are
weak, as they are in most relatively poor communities, no one will accept
the risk of participating in a group lending program.
The general implication of the Grameen and South Shore Bank
models is that information-related risk can be reduced by adopting16
methods that (1) harness local information to serve the bank's purposes;'
(2) transfer lending risk away from the bank, whether to borrowers (as in
the case of group lending) or to third parties; and (3) coordinate lending
with local efforts to promote business development, housing development,
education, and job training. Group lending is a simple scheme that happens
to implement the first two methods quite well, while making only slight
112 See Mark M. Pitt & Shahidur R. Khandker, The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs
on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?, 106 J. POL. ECON. 958
(1998).

113 Jaffer notes that Grameen Bank loans must be repaid in equal installments over fifty
weeks. See Jaffer, supra note 49, at 18.
114 On the keh system and rotating credit associations generally, see Cao, supra note 108, at
874-84; Elyssa Getreu, Taking a Lesson from Korea for Lending in the Inner City, AM. BANKER, June
29, 1992, at 7, available in 1992 WL 5264873.

115 1 should note that bank-based keh systems have been proposed in the United States. See,
e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 345; Getreu, supra note 114, at 7.
116 On group lending and the economics of information, see Timothy Besley et al., The
Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 792 (1993); and Timothy
Besley & Stephen Coate, Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral, 46 J. DEV.

ECON. I (1995).
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progress on the third. The South Shore Bank model is particularly good at
the first and third methods, while faring poorly on the second.
A community development bank's risk of failure can be reduced
through public subsidies. For example, banks benefit from being
designated municipal depositories, especially in large cities like Chicago
that have millions to deposit. Holding municipal deposits can be a form of
subsidy, if the terms are good, because the bank collects profits (the
difference between market interest rates for loans and the amount paid to
the city deposit holder) on a stable base of city deposits without incurring a
risk that the deposit base will erode. The institutional risk associated with
inner-city lending could be reduced by making it a significant holder of
municipal deposits. Each city should have an incentive to provide this
subsidy, given the external benefits of integration into the formal financial
sector and social capital formation." 7 Subsidization via holding
government deposits can be expanded to encourage further integration.
State welfare payments could be deposited directly into this ideal
community bank. In states that experiment with voucher schemes for
education and other services, the bank could serve as a private
administrator of vouchers designed for the poor.
The federal government also could subsidize inner-city development
lending by providing tax credits for development loans," ' or creating an
equivalent to Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae that would facilitate the
securitization of small business loans in depressed urban areas. 119 These
117 Indeed, the fair lending movement apparently began with an ordinance passed in Chicago
in 1974 requiring banks bidding for city deposits to disclose records for residential, consumer, and
commercial lending by census tract. See Ken Martin, Erasing the Redline: How Community Groups
and Banks Are Changing Lending Practices Around the County, AUSTIN BUS. J., Feb. 19, 1990, at 23.
118 See Craig Marcus, Note, Beyond the Boundaries of the Community Reinvestment Act and
the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based Framework for Generating Low- and ModerateIncome Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 753 (1996).
119 Fannie Mae is a federally-sponsored, privately-owned corporation that purchases
mortgage loans from lenders and issues mortgage-backed securities. The U.S. Treasury stands behind
all of Fannie Mae's obligations. Freddie Mac, which is wholly owned by 12 Federal Home Loan
Banks, serves the same function, though focusing on conventional mortgages. For a basic description
of this program, see id. at 755 & n.244 (citing Robin P. Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A
Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991, 992-1010 (1986)). Robert W.
Shields notes that the CDFI Act encourages the securitization of CDFI loans by giving assistance to
institutions that purchase CDFI loans. See Shields, supra note 36, at 669. However, Shields's review
suggests that the limitations on assistance to firms that purchase loans from CDFIs probably will
prevent this activity from growing to the size of the secondary markets in home mortgages. See id. One
promising innovation is a recent mutual fund designed to help banks meet their CRA obligations. See
Barbara A. Rehm, Mutual Fund Building a Portfolio To Ease Banks over CRA Hurdle, AM. BANKER,
June 15, 1999, at 1. Marcus proposes that participation in Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae be limited to
those banks that can demonstrate a good record in terms of lending to low- and moderate-income
borrowers. Marcus, supra note 118, at 755-57. 1 am reluctant to endorse this proposal. There is nothing
preventing banks and investors from establishing a parallel secondary market that does not have an
implicit government guarantee supporting it. If compliance with the Marcus proposal were
burdensome, such a market might be established, which would have troubling implications for the
original secondary market created by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. For example, if banks that did

228

Banks and Inner Cities
programs introduce a new problem: Lenders may accept too much risk.
This tendency toward excessive risk can be particularly severe in an
attempt to emulate Freddie Mac, given the moral hazard introduced by the
implicit government guarantee supporting mortgage securities sold in the
secondary market. But in the case of inner-city lending, this may be a cost
worth bearing. Given that competition and deposit insurance already
combine to encourage banks to take excessive risks,120 a preferable
regulatory regime would encourage banks to channel their risk-taking into
activities that provide a substantial benefit for society.
While these proposals would reduce the risk associated with lending
in disadvantaged urban communities, they obviously would not eliminate
it. An ideal regime would involve institutions that could monitor the risktaking of community development banks, while permitting them to carry
out their mission.' 1 But the existing regulatory regime makes this
development unlikely.
III. Regulatory Obstacles to Development Lending
Although an inner-city economic development bank along the general
lines just described could be established, there are regulatory obstacles to a
large-scale effort. A city-based development bank would experience
conflicting pressures from fair lending regulations on one hand and safety
and soundness constraints on the other. 2 Moreover, subsidization at the
municipal or federal level to support such a bank would be politically
infeasible.
A.

Conflict Between FairLending and Safety Regulation

Since a lending program that focuses on relatively poor and
segregated communities entails a greater degree of risk than banks
typically accept, a small community development bank probably would be
constrained or, at least, carefully scrutinized by safety and soundness
virtually no lending to low-income home purchasers were excluded from the existing secondary
mortgage market, their loans could be securitized and sold into an alternative secondary market. This
would lower the average quality of securities in the original market, perhaps leading to a process of
adverse selection.
120 On the risk-taking incentives created by deposit insurance, see, for example, Better than
Basle, ECONOMIST, June 19, 1999, at 80 (reviewing bank safety regulation).
121
For details on such an ideal regime, see infra text accompanying notes 135-36.
122 By "fair lending regulation," I refer specifically to the CRA. The conflict between safety
and fairness regulation has been noted before. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 318-24. A
recent empirical study confirms this conflict. See Jeffrey W. Gunther, Between a Rock and a Hard
Place: The CRA-Safety and Soundness Pinch, ECON. & FIN. REV., 2d Qtr. 1999, at 32-41 (showing
that concentrating bank assets in loans and managing capital at relatively low levels tends to help CRA
ratings while hurting CAMEL (safety and soundness) ratings). As will become evident in the text, I
focus on the conflict between fairness and safety regulation from a different perspective.
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regulators, who generally require diversification in loan portfolios.
Consequently, an institution that lends primarily to residents of the inner
city probably would be constrained to extend fewer loans than it would
like. Indeed, banks lending in inner-city markets will have a low loan-todeposit ratio compared to banks operating outside of these areas. The fair
lending constraint now enters. Given the bank's low loan-to-deposit ratio,
imposed in part by its own prudence and in part by regulators, and given
competition from larger rivals who must also meet their fair lending
obligations, the bank would tend to fare poorly on community lending
evaluations. These low evaluations will lead regulators to reject future
plans for expansion-since the regulators take into account community
eliminating the bank's ability to reduce
lending evaluation 1records-thus
23
risk in that fashion.
There are two constraints at work in this process: the safety constraint
and the CRA constraint. One could suggest that the bank ignore the safety
and soundness constraint and merely engage in the additional lending that
it desires. But banks do not ignore the safety and soundness regulations
because bank charters can be and are effectively revoked for failing to
meet them.1 24 A bank will, given the choice between meeting the CRA
requirements and safety and soundness requirements, opt in favor of the
latter if it wants to remain in business. Failing to meet the CRA
requirements only prevents future expansion, while falling short in
meeting safety regulations can put an end to the careers of bank managers.
There is a paradox already alluded to in this problem. Bank expansion
often reduces the institutional risk of failure. By expanding, a bank can
limit its exposure to the geographically-associated risks that have been the
primary sources of bank failures. 125 Thus, in an ideal world, a bank that
intends to do community lending would expand in order to reduce its risk
and to take advantage of economies of scale. The CRA constraint,
however, may prevent this desirable expansion, providing a regulatory
Catch-22. In order to reduce risk and enhance community lending, the
bank should expand. However, in order to expand, the bank must do more
community lending according to one set of regulators, which may be
prohibited by another set of regulators. Although the safety and soundness
constraint would reduce the scale of the bank's operations, the
combination of both safety and soundness and the CRA create a potential
123 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 302 (noting that "an institution in the 'substantial
noncompliance' category can assume that the banking agencies will look with disfavor at any
application, even the most routine, for a deposit facility").
124 On the disciplinary actions available to bank regulators, see JONATHAN R. MACEY &
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 570-603 (2d ed. 1997).

125 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 33, at 75 ("Far and away the largest number of failed
institutions have been small banks in the farm and energy belts where the inability to diversify spelled
disaster.").
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barrier to the expansion of a small development-oriented bank.
Both constraints contribute equally to this paradox. On one hand, if
we remove the CRA constraint, the bank could expand to a level at which
conservative bank managers would accept additional risk. On the other
hand, if we remove the safety and soundness restrictions, the bank could
lend more and, perhaps, satisfy the requirements of the CRA. Although it
may seem obvious that the CRA should be removed as a constraint, the
safety and soundness constraint may be more burdensome for the bank in
the long term.
This paradox probably serves as a description of the bind that some
community banks find themselves in now. Small banks are overrepresented among banks that have poor CRA ratings (either "needs to
improve" or "substantial noncompliance"). 2 6 The relative performance of
small banks in the CRA ratings is illustrated by Table 1, which shows the
distribution of CRA ratings by various supervisory agencies and asset size
in 1992, as compiled by Griffith Garwood and Delores Smith. Of the 293
banks in Table 1 that received a "needs to improve" or "substantial
noncompliance" rating, 212 were banks with less than 100 million in
assets. In other words, seventy-two percent of the banks listed in Table I
with low CRA grades were small banks.

126 Cf Leonard Bierman et al., The Community Reinvestment Act: A Preliminary Empirical
Analysis, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 397 (1994) (finding that highly-rated banks are significantly more
likely to be part of a holding company and to have numerous affiliates than banks with low CRA
ratings); Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 302-03 (noting that large banks on average have better CRA
ratings).
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Table 1.

Asset

Size

of

Institution (dollars)

Federal

Deposit

Insurance

Federal Reserve System

Corporation

o

S

N

SN

0

S

N

SN

Less than 100 million

149

969

38

4

37

245

24

4

100-250 million

30

84

3

0

15

37

4

0

250-500 million

9

16

1

0

3

15

1

0

500 million - Ibillion

3

4

0

0

3

8

1

0

1 - 10 billion

2

4

0

0

3

10

0

0

More than 10 billion

0

0

0

0

0

4

0

0

All

193

1077

42

4

61

319

30

4

Asset

Size

of

Institution (dollars)

Office of the Comptroller of

Office

the Currency

Supervision

of

Thrift

0

S

N

SN

0

S

N

SN

Less than 100 million

23

256

65

2

16

248

71

4

100-250 million

21

94

15

0

25

118

28

1

250-500 million

5

29

1

1

8

46

11

0

500 million - I billion

6

19

1

1

5

27

1

0

1 - 10 billion

8

49

4

0

9

33

7

0

More than 10 billion

8

9

0

0

2

1

0

0

All

71

456

86

4

65

473

118

5

Source: Garwood & Smith, supra note 12, at 257 tbl.l.

Yet, many of the small banks are ethnic and minority-owned banks
that were established with the primary aim of providing loans for business
purposes within a small ethnic or minority community. Indeed, one of the
ironies of the CRA as implemented
is that minority-owned banks have
27
received relatively poor grades.
What explains the relatively poor performance of minority-owned
banks in the CRA evaluation process? Because the theory that community
banks operating within cities discriminate against "their own kind" seems
implausible, the most likely explanation is that this reflects the regulatory
127 See Harold A. Black et al., Do Black-Owned Banks Discriminate Against Black
Borrowers?, 11 J. FIN. SERV. REs. 189, 202 (1997); see also Leslie Eaton, A Shaky Pillarin Harlem:
Black-Owned Carver Bank Seeks Solid Financial Base, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999, at 21 (noting
conservative lending approach of Carver and other minority-owned banks).
The relatively poor record of minority-owned banks is also reflected in the CRA ratings of
Hispanic- and Asian-owned banks. In the two year ratings period ending June 1992, 10% of all banks
received a "needs to improve" or "substantial noncompliance" rating, versus 20% for Hispanic banks
and 36% for Asian banks. See Robert B. Cox, Minority Banks Seen Lagging in CRA Arena, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 20, 1993, at 1.
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Catch-22 these banks have encountered. There are six ways in which the
minority-owned banks may run afoul of CRA examiners. First, to the
extent the ratings are based on comparisons among banks, which seems
unavoidable, large banks will have a greater incentive to score high on the
CRA examinations, because they generally will have the strongest desire
to expand, if only to keep up with their peers. 128 Given that minorityowned banks are relatively small, they will suffer as a result of this
competition, because high CRA marks are less valuable to them than to the
large banks. Second, minority-owned banks often operate in riskier
markets, without the economies of scale and revenue sources of the large
banks, creating a higher cost of complying with regulatory lending
demands. 29 Third, to the extent large banks are compelled by the need to
earn CRA credits to extend loans in depressed communities,13 they are
likely to extend loans to the most creditworthy applicants in these areas.
This choice leaves the riskier credit applicants to the smaller minorityowned banks, which, in turn, further increases their costs of complying
with the CRA. Fourth, the minority-owned banks may be victims of their
own outreach efforts, to the extent these efforts lead to high rejection rates
among loan applicants. Fifth, while a minority-owned bank may focus on
serving a narrowly defined community consisting of a particular minority
group, CRA examiners may not draw the bank's service boundaries so
narrowly. Thus, a bank serving an Asian-American community may
receive relatively poor CRA grades for failing to reach out to potential
borrowers who are outside this particular community.13 Finally, in terms
of the competition for high CRA grades, the minority-owned banks may
sometimes be victims of discriminatory patterns of conduct that make it
difficult for them to compete for CRA marks. Consider loan syndicates,
for example. When large banks form a syndicate to lend to a big inner-city
developer, all members of the syndicate receive CRA credit for the
amounts they lend. However, since the banks that are invited to take part
in these syndicates are chosen on the basis of past experience and social
connections, it is not likely that the minority-owned banks will be included
in these arrangements.
128
129

See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 303.
On the costs of compliance, see Anjan V. Thakor & Jess C. Beltz, An EmpiricalAnalysis

of the Costs of Regulatory Compliance, in CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 549

(19th ed. 1983) (finding that net income and CRA compliance costs as function of asset size decline
with institution size).
130 On the CRA's competitive impact on minority-owned banks, see Macey & Miller, supra
note I, at 341; see also John R. Wilke, Giving Credit: Mortgage Lending to Minorities Shows a Sharp
1994 Increase, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1996, at Al (noting that minority-owned Boston Bank of
Commerce was almost "knocked out of the mortgage market by a flood of cheap credit in the past two
years from ... big banks that had been criticized over their community lending").
131 See, e.g., Eugene D. O'Kelly, Small Banks Need Quick Relieffrom CRA Requirements,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 2, 1993, at 7.
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The Difficulty in Findinga Solution

There. are two obvious solutions to the conflicting regulatory
incentives, and potential Catch-22, that a development bank would
experience. One is to modify the CRA, the other is to modify safety and
soundness regulation. Both solutions are politically difficult and perhaps
impossible.
The current CRA framework is particularly burdensome to one type
of bank: a relatively small community development-oriented bank located
in the inner city. Banks of this type do not constitute an interest group with
the necessary clout to modify the CRA. On the other hand, certain parties
prefer the CRA regulatory regime as it presently stands. One group
consists of direct beneficiaries: community pressure groups and politicians
who seek a support base within these groups. 3 2 The CRA authorizes
regulators to consider community development efforts in reviewing the
expansion plans of a regulated institution. Therefore, the CRA provides
community-lending interest groups with a forum for airing their
complaints and gaining the attention of bank officers and regulators.
Politicians benefit because the CRA allows them to deliver payoffs to their
support groups in the form of directed lending to these groups. The
regulators themselves form an additional, though small, interest group in
favor of the status quo, since much of their human capital is strongly tied
to maintaining the current process.
The current regulatory regime does not injure all lending institutions.
As a method to assess the effect of the CRA regime, it is reasonable to
divide banks into three groups: small banks in cities, small banks outside
of cities, and large banks (that are necessarily in cities). I have already
noted that the CRA is quite burdensome. for small banks in inner-city
neighborhoods because they are placed in a bind between the demands of
the CRA and those of safety and soundness regulators. The small banks
outside of cities do not suffer like their counterparts in the cities, and some
of them benefit. For example, a community-based small bank in a middleclass suburb can meet its community investment obligations by offering
residential loans to moderate-income residents, many of whom work as
local school teachers, policemen, and so on. For many of these banks,
meeting the CRA obligations is simply a matter of carrying out their
business plans. Moreover, these banks are largely immune from the CRA
protests and complaints inherent to operating within the city.
Large banks, in comparison, benefit from the current regulatory
regime. For many of them, the cost of complying with the CRA is
132
33.
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See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 1, at 281-82; Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 332-
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relatively small, as evidenced by their excellent compliance records.' 33 The
burden of maintaining a compliance officer on staff is relatively small for
large banks. Large banks earn profits in high-end service markets to
subsidize lending and services, such as low-cost checking accounts, in
low-end markets. 1 4 In addition, large banks can satisfy their CRA
obligations by lending to the most creditworthy applicants in the inner
cities, such as large developers, while leaving the riskier applicants to the
small banks. Indeed, large banks have both the wherewithal and incentives
to structure their lending programs in a manner that exposes them to the
least amount of risk sufficient to satisfy their CRA obligations.' The ex
post distribution of compliance costs
gives large banks a competitive
36
1
rivals.
smaller
their
over
advantage
Today's regulatory regime, by rendering small bank expansion more
difficult, generates an additional competitive advantage to large banks.
Small banks are, for reasons already given, effectively prohibited from
expanding in inner-city markets to challenge the large ones. The large
ones, all sharing roughly the same advantages (or disadvantages) with
respect to inner-city lending, need not worry about competing against a
bank with superior information or some other advantage. This competitive
barrier provides large banks an additional advantage in dealing with local
political leaders. Given the city's reliance on the large banks for lending,
133 On the compliance abilities of large banks, see supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
134 Where are these profits coming from? A recent study of bank profitability concludes that
during 1991-1997, cost productivity worsened while profit productivity improved. See ALLEN BERGER
&

LORETTA

J.

MESTER,

WHAT EXPLAINS

THE

DRAMATIC CHANGES

IN

COST AND

PROFIT

PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY? (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Univ. of Pa. Working

Paper No. 99-1, 1999). The banks earned greater profits from fees connected to new services, such as
mutual funds, derivatives, ATM networks, on-line services, and debit and credit cards. See id. at 27;
see also Lawrence J. Radecki, Banks' Payments-Driven Revenues, ECON. POL'Y REV., FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N.Y., Apr./June 1999 (finding that payment services bring in from one-third to two-fifths of
the combined operating revenue of the 25 largest bank holding companies).
135 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 25, at 184-87 (discussing CRA "compliance
stratagems"). Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that large banks have discovered ways to splinter
lending pressure groups and preemptively to strike the least burdensome deals. For example, several
pressure groups complained that Fleet Bank in Boston entered into an agreement with Bruce Marks, a
prominent CRA activist, and eventually ignored the groups. See Yawu Miller, Mortgage Program
Comes Under Fire, BAY STATE BANNER, June 17, 1999, at I. Fleet had no incentive to continue to
negotiate with the community groups after striking a deal with Marks for two reasons: first, because
the Marks deal would help the bank meet its obligations; and second, because it would purchase
Marks's support for future CRA hearings necessitated by the bank's expansion plans. The community
groups complained that the agreement between Marks and Fleet failed to address the real development
concerns of the affected communities. See id.
136 Of course, no spokesperson for a large bank has, to my knowledge, offered this as a
reason for supporting the CRA. However, it is not difficult to find statements by officers of major
banks suggesting satisfaction with the current regulatory regime. For example, the chairman of Bank of
America, Hugh McColl, is reported to have said that "[m]y company supports the Community
Reinvestment Act in spirit and in fact ....
We're quite happy living with the existing rules." Philip
Angelides, Prosperity Hinges on CRA Loans, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 18, 1999 at II (quoting
McColl).
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the city leadership is bound to reciprocate with indirect subsidies, such as
the placement of municipal deposits under terms suitable to the large
banks.
The competitive barrier benefiting large banks is buttressed by the
process of CRA regulation. 3 7 Large banks have two advantages in the
evaluation process. First, assessment of lending is considerably easier in
the case of a small bank than in the case of a large one, given the greater
scope and complexity of large bank operations. The regulators are at an
informational disadvantage in the case of large banks and must rely to
some extent on the evidence they are given by the bank. In the case of a
small bank, it is easier to evaluate independently the bank's community
lending efforts. Second, CRA examiners, unlike safety examiners, tend to
be young and inexperienced. 38 This use of novice examiners makes the
informational disparity problem worse, suggesting that the examiners
are
139
likely to be a bit more humble in their dealings with large banks.
The competitive advantage also assists large banks in fending off
competition from foreign banks and the new Internet banks.140 Foreign
banks are likely to find it more costly, at least initially, to discover the
rules of the game as played in a specific geographic market. A savvy bank
located in an area with a high probability of CRA-related protests does not
typically wait for the start of the merger or expansion process before
addressing potential CRA issues. A sophisticated bank officer knows that
he should make contributions to community-lending interest groups in
advance, in order to quiet them before either merger or expansion
applications are filed with the relevant regulatory body. Such an officer
probably knows the identities of the relevant parties, their salient concerns,
and perhaps their strengths and weaknesses at the bargaining table. A
foreign bank, attempting to enter an ui'ban market, may not be aware of the
practices of sophisticated incumbent banks; or if it is aware, it may not
137 One scholarly critique of the CRA noted that it provides an advantage to established
banks relative to those trying to "reposition themselves in the market." Macey & Miller, supra note 1,
at 315.
138 Bankers have noted the lack of training and inexperience of examiners in their complaints
over the uncertainty surrounding CRA enforcement. See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 25, at 167-68.
139 Both an informational disparity and a disparity in social status probably have some effect
on the behavior of examiners. James Pierce hints at the social status issue when he notes that
[g]overnment supervisors who interrogate bankers earn maybe sixty thousand
dollars a year; the people they question often make ten or twenty times that and
operate out of offices that make a regulator's quarters look like a shelter for the
homeless. How can regulators second-guess the management of these multinational
corporations about the riskiness of a specific loan?
PIERCE, supra note 33, at 99.
140 Interet banking apparently has the potential to cut costs substantially. According to a
study by Lehman Brothers, a transfer between bank accounts costs one cent over the Intemet, 27¢
using an ATM, and $1.27 using a bank teller. See How To Live with Falling Prices, ECONOMIST, June
12, 1999, at 57.
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know how to identify or how to go about paying off the correct parties. In
addition, a foreign bank might encounter some excessive demands, given
the presence of local xenophobia.141 Pressure groups and politicians may
also perceive that foreign banks are relatively inexperienced in local affairs
and especially eager to enter the market. As for the new Internet banks,
they too may be hobbled by the CRA, 142because it is unclear at this stage
how the statute will be applied to them.
The three interest groups that have the most power to influence CRA
legislation are local lending pressure groups, politicians, and banks. Yet of
these groups, only one relatively small sub-group of banks has an incentive
to modify the CRA to remove the obstacles to additional community
development lending. Potential customers also have an incentive to see the
regime modified, but they are too dispersed and uninformed to have an
impact on the legislative process. Given this set of incentives, the current
regulatory structure is likely to remain for some time.
The current regime does, of course, generate some lending at
preferable terms to inner-city residences and businesses. This effect is
desirable, though it would be observed under an alternative regime in
which development-oriented banks were given greater encouragement.
The lending that does take place provides a large share of benefits to
relatively undeserving parties, such as inner-city developers who gain by
receiving favorable terms, creating yet another concentrated interest group
in favor of the current regulatory regime. For example, the statute gives
large banks incentives to compete aggressively in lending to large innercity developers, leaving the riskiest credit applicants to the small banks.
The large banks gain by meeting their CRA obligations when they extend
loans to a developer building a hotel or a theater.
Now consider the second major regulatory obstacle to community
development lending, safety and soundness regulation. Many
commentators see a need for this type of regulation in view of the moral
141 1 do not have in mind hatred of foreigners but a rational distrust that community-lending
interest groups are likely to have in this case. They will tend to be skeptical of foreign banks, viewing
them as even less concerned with the welfare of local residents than the typical large domestic bank.
142 On May 3, 1999, banking regulators published revised guidelines to help examiners and
financial institutions comply with the CRA. However, the new guidelines did not address the issue of
"branchless banking," and stated that out-of-assessment-area activities would be addressed in materials
issued for public comment later in the year. See Bank Regulators Revise Guidance on Community
Reinvestment Act, U.S.L.W., May 11, 1999, at 2663. The tensions surrounding the regulation of
branchless banking erupted into public criticism by Senator Phil Gramm of Office of Thrift
Supervision Director Ellen Seidman on May 7, 1999. Gramm complained in a letter to Seidman that
she had gone too far in suggesting methods of applying the CRA to nontraditional banks in a speech
she made on June 17th. Specifically, Gramm stated that the OTS did not have statutory authority td
reinterpret the CRA in order to apply it to nontraditional banks. Seidman had suggested that
assessment areas for CRA purposes could be defined by the location of the bank's customers, rather
than the location of the bank's branches. See Barbara A. Rehm, Gramm Chews Out OTS Directorover
CRA Ideas, AM. BANKER, July 8, 1999, at 2.
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hazard problem generated by deposit insurance. 143 Deposit insurance
removes some of the institutional risk of lending to banks, and for this
reason leads to more aggressive lending policies than would otherwise be
observed, a problem often referred to as moral hazard.' 44 Safety and
soundness regulation is viewed as necessary in order to prevent banks
from taking on an undesirably high level of risk.
While the moral hazard argument provides a reasonable case for
regulation, there are many ways in which regulation for safety and
soundness could occur. The current safety regime is one in which banks
are judged according to a uniform set of criteria. 145 However, not all banks
are alike with respect to the risk generated by a particular activity, and not
all borrowers of a certain type (for example, small firms or governments)
are alike with respect to the risk that they may incur. 146 An ideal safety
regime would provide incentives that respond to the specific level of risk
generated by a bank's loan portfolio.
One can draw an analogy here to insurance markets. Consider liability
insurance for automobile accidents: an ideal insurance regime would be
one in which the insurance premium responds immediately to any slight
change in the level of accident risk associated with a driver's conduct. The
premium ideally should reflect the amount of driving the driver does and
the amount of care he takes when driving. In an ideal regime, the premium
would move, second by second, to reflect each instantaneous change in the
level of risk created by the insured party. 147 In this ideal system, the driver
143 See, e.g., Better than Basle, supra note 120.
144 On the moral hazard problem in banking, see Sudipto Bhattacharya et al., The Economics
of Bank Regulation, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 745, 755-57 (1998).
145 Federal regulators use a safety and soundness rating system that examines six factors:
capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk
(CAMELS). Based on this evaluation, the bank is assigned a numerical ranking from one through five,
with five being the worst. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 122, at 32. For a discussion of the difficulties
of assessing safety and soundness under this system, see PIERCE, supra note 33, at 97-100. For large
banks, the most important safety rules are the capital-adequacy standards applied to banks that operate
internationally. See When Borrowers Go Bad, ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 1998, at 79, 79. The "Basle
standards" require less capital to be set aside for loans to governments and financial institutions than
for corporate loans. This has the perverse effect of encouraging banks to lend to risky governments
over safer corporations, because a risky government borrower will pay a higher interest rate but will
not force the bank to set aside more capital. See id.
146 See When Borrowers Go Bad, supra note 145, at 79-80 (discussing capital requirements
imposed on international banks and proposals by banks to set up a more individualized regulatory
regime by having them use their own credit-risk models to determine capital requirements). In addition
to the problem that capital adequacy rules may not be sufficiently individualized, there is the additional
difficulty of comparing risk levels across banks that focus on different markets. See, e.g., Richard
Cookson, On a Wing and a Prayer: Survey of InternationalBanking, ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 1999, at 67 (discussing differentiation among banks). As Cookson observes, "First Union, for example, has
'concentrated on consumers and small businesses; Bank One on credit cards, which account for 30% of
its assets .
I..."
Id. at 6. Presumably, a bank that focuses on a specific market has invested more than
the average bank in methods to control risks associated with that market.
147 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120, 128-29
(1982) (proving optimal results when insurer can monitor conduct of insured, and premium therefore
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would have an incentive to adjust his risk-taking behavior in response to
the change in the premium. A large upward increase in the instantaneous
premium would lead the driver to take additional care.
Note that this analogy implies a highly individualized and
instantaneous approach to regulation. Of course, this ideal is infeasible
because of transaction and measurement costs, but insurers try to approach
it by classifying drivers into risk categories and, sometimes, rating
insurance prices by driver experience. An optimal system of safety
regulation for banks would attempt to approach this ideal. Thus, an ideal
safety system would charge each bank a risk premium that reflects the
level of risk generated within a certain time period by the bank's loan
portfolio. Such a system would permit and encourage specialists to
examine the bank's level of risk-taking, because a closer alignment
between the price and real cost of risk would benefit both parties to the
insurance contract; it benefits the bank by providing the lowest price for
risk coverage and the insurer by providing a competitive advantage
relative to other firms.
An ideal decentralized and individualized safety-regulation
regime
would mimic an insurance market under perfect conditions. It is possible
that, in such a regime, community development banks would be given
greater freedom to lend than under the existing regime. Risk assessment
specialists could reach conclusions that differ from those of regulatory
bodies. The Grameen Bank has demonstrated that lending to poor
communities can be carried out in a relatively safe manner, 148 yet it is
doubtful that the Grameen Bank approach would have been viewed
favorably by U.S. safety regulators. An individualized safety-regulation
system would permit regulators and lending institutions to study their
markets in order to understand the best methods to reduce risk while
meeting credit demands. Risk transference through the Grameen group
lending model, or perhaps through the securitization of small business
loans, could be developed as a general method to minimize the risk of
lending in low-income inner-city areas.
Recognizing the need to control moral hazard in the banking industry,
one obvious alternative to the current regime would be effectively to
privatize safety regulation by requiring banks to insure deposits in the
private insurance market. 149 Such a regime would encourage specialization
in methods of risk reduction and risk assessment for lending markets, and
reflects precise level of risk generated by insured).
148 See Jaffer, supra note 49, at 3 (noting Grameen Bank's repayment rate of 97%).
149 For a proposal to privatize deposit insurance, see Bert Ely, Regulatory Moral Hazard:
The Real Moral Hazard in Federal Deposit Insurance, Paper Presented at Federalist Society
Conference 3 (1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). On private deposit insurance
schemes, see Charles Calomiris, Deposit Insurance: Lessons from the Record, ECON. PERSP., FED.
RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 15-19 (1989).
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may be superior to the current regime in terms of safety regulation. And by
reducing the risk of bank lending within poor urban areas, it would
encourage greater specialization of banking services to these markets.' 50
Under the current regime, bank officers sometimes rely on safety
regulators to provide warning about sources of risk in the bank's
operations.151 The regulators, however, do not have the best incentives to
discover risk and issue optimally-timed warnings. 52 Their fates are not
tied to the health of the banks they regulate, and they are not always
penalized for failing to act swiftly to prevent disasters. 53 On the other
hand, there is little to ensure that they will not act too swiftly in some cases
and revoke a bank charter unnecessarily. In other words, because of
agency costs, one cannot be sure that risk regulators have the best
incentives under the existing regime. A privatized regime would provide
risk overseers
(insurance firms) with appropriate incentives to monitor and
4
warn.

15

However, the current safety regulation regime is unlikely to disappear
soon. Banks are charged insurance premiums for federal deposit insurance,
but these premiums are affected by political considerations. It is doubtful
150 One might object that this proposal could result in more costly monitoring of lenders than
under the current regime. However, the amount of resources devoted to monitoring should not be an
issue under a private insurance regime, because private lenders and insurers presumably will engage in
monitoring only when the benefit exceeds the cost.
151 Indeed, given federal deposit insurance, banks have incentives to take on excessive risk,
see Better than Basle, supra note 120, so it naturally falls to regulators in many cases to provide the
warnings. For an account of the savings-and-loan crisis attributing the crisis to lax supervision and bad
incentives, see PIERCE, supra note 33, at 77. Bert Ely notes that bank regulators are often as well
informed as bank officers about the risks associated with a bank's business policies, and perhaps better
informed to the extent they have superior information on economic conditions outside of the bank's
local market. See Ely, supra note 149, at 3. Whether better informed or not about operational risks,
bank regulators certainly have better information as to the likelihood of a regulatory directive that
affects the bank. One interesting perspective on this issue is suggested by a recent study of stock
market returns. See Allen Berger & Sally M. Davies, The Information Content ofBank Examinations,
14 J. FIN. SERV. REs. 117 (1998). Berger and Davies find that bank examination downgrades appear to
reveal unfavorable private information about bank condition, given the stock market reaction to such
downgrades. They note that this result supports the theory that banks hold substantial private
information. However, given that bank examiners are likely to make the key decisions that harm
investors, the results may also reflect the private information held by regulators. See id.
152 For a model of safety regulation that allows for the possibility that bank regulators will
have incentives that deviate from the social interest, see Amaud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, SelfInterestedBank Regulation, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 206 (1993). For a report detailing numerous incidents
suggesting overzealous enforcement by bank regulators, see Terry Carter, Banking on Fear,A.B.A. J.,
July 1999, at 40.
153 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 149, at 5-6 (discussing absence of liability concerns among
bank regulators).
154 The reason for this is that all of the relevant costs are internalized among the contracting
parties, which implies that divergences between actual and optimal regulatory policies will be
minimized. Since insurers must pay for losses due to negligent conduct, they have incentives to
monitor up to the point at which the marginal social benefit from monitoring (avoided losses) just
equals the marginal cost of monitoring. We are unlikely to find the same incentives under a public
safety regime, because the private benefits of monitoring (for public regulators) may not be closely tied
to the social benefits (avoided losses).
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that the prices charged banks to fund federal deposit insurance are the
same as would be observed in a private market for deposit insurance. In
particular, given that the insurance premiums are not sensitive to the
management policies of the individual bank, it is clear that safer banks are
providing a subsidy to risky banks under the current regime. Moreover,
because small banks are generally not as well diversified as large banks,
and therefore have relatively large failure probabilities, small banks are
generally charged prices below the level that would be set in a private
insurance market.
These subsidies suggest the presence of large interest groups in favor
of maintaining the current safety regime, even though it is probably
inferior in every measurable respect to a system in which deposits were
privately insured. Many large banks have taken on risky lending strategies,
even though they are heavily regulated. 155 To the extent they benefit both
from the federal deposit insurance guarantee and the "too-big-to-fail"
policy generally accepted and explicitly embodied in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvements Act of 1991 (FDICIA), 5 6 the
likelihood of moral hazard infecting their lending policies is greater than in
the case of a small bank. Moreover, because consolidation in the banking
industry has increased the deposit insurance fund's vulnerability to a large
bank failure, 57 the moral hazard subsidy to large banks has probably
grown in recent years. Small banks, on the other hand, have traditionally
carried the highest failure risks. 58 To the extent small banks pay less than
the actuarially fair price for deposit insurance, 1they
too are encouraged to
59
lend beyond the economically appropriate level.
With some large banks and probably many small banks benefiting
from deposit insurance, it is quite likely that the number of interest groups
favoring the current safety regime exceeds the number opposed. Whatever
the tally, it would be difficult to modify the existing safety regime without
running into fierce opposition.

155 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 33, at 74-75 (discussing lending policies of large banks and
lending crises during the 1980s).
156 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1994). For a review of the FDICIA discussing the "systemic risk"
exception, which protects deposits exceeding $100,000 if the bank's failure is deemed to present a
serious risk to the financial system, see Robert E. Litan, Regulation: Disciplining Large Banks After
FDICIA, 19 J. RETAIL BANKING SERV. 57, 58 (1997).

157 See Robert Oshinsky, Effects of Bank Consolidation on the Bank Insurance Fund, Div. of
Res. & Statistics, FDIC (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
158 See id. at 5-6.
159 I should note that the FDIC recently introduced risk-based deposit insurance prices. See,
e.g., Bhattacharya et al., supra note 144, at 757. However, it is generally well known that the FDIC's
pricing system deviates from what would be observed in a private deposit insurance market, because
any effort to move toward real risk-based pricing would generate complaints and political pressure

from banks that would see their premiums rise.
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Obstacles to a Local Solution

I have suggested a local alternative to regulatory reform for the
purpose of encouraging inner-city development: having cities subsidize
development lending programs by choosing municipal depositories on the
basis of their development efforts. Intuitively, this is a sensible approach
because it would involve using public funds to subsidize an effort with
largely public rewards. Since cities become undesirable because of
declines in the level and quality of public goods like safety and education,
city leaders should have incentives to use the resources they control to
improve the welfare of residents in the poorest communities, where such
public goods are poorly supplied.
As plausible as this may seem as a strategy for community
development, it is unlikely to be implemented in a serious and widespread
fashion.16 ° The incentives of city leaders are skewed in a way that makes
such a strategy unappealing to them. Mayors often seek and rely on the
support of the large financial institutions and businesses operating within
their cities. Residents of poor neighborhoods do not fund political
campaigns. In addition, they have little incentive to invest time and
resources into understanding community development issues, and
generally lack the resources to make such investments. The result is a
process that provides few, if any, incentives to use public funds in creative
ways to subsidize community development efforts. The dominant
incentive is to use municipal funds in order to shore up support from
individuals and institutions that are perceived to be influential in local
politics.16'
IV. The Political Economy of Regulatory Reform: An Application to the
CRA
The regulatory obstacles that discourage development efforts in inner
cities probably are not accidental. They are consistent with a view of the
legislative process that emphasizes the importance of private interests in
shaping legislation.1 2 Concentrated, well-organized pressure groups often
obtain legislation that favors their interests, even though it may harm a
160 1should note that at least a few cities have tried this approach, most notably Chicago in
1974. See Martin, supra note 117, at 23. However, the approach is not widespread, and the reporting
regime in Chicago is largely unused today.
161 Perhaps the best evidence of this problem is the poor state of infrastructure in many
cities, one of the urban problems described in Dreier, supra note 61, at 1370-71. The infrastructure
problems are the results of years of neglect by city leaders focusing on short-term political gain, rather
than the long-term economic health of their cities.
162 See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & .MGMT.
Sci. 3 (1971).
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much larger group of disorganized individuals. 163 The classic example is
provided by tariffs on imported goods. Tariffs are often imposed at the
behest of organized domestic producers who fear competition from foreign
producers. In most cases, however, the loss to domestic consumers from
the imposition of tariffs and other import controls exceeds the gain to
domestic producers. 64
Under this view of legislation, the likelihood of regulatory reform
increases when the difference between the loss to the disorganized group
and the gain to the organized group (note that the loss exceeds the gain)
increases. 65 As this difference increases, the organized group's incentive
to hold on to its legislative benefits falls relative the disorganized group's
incentive to change the rules. The difference between the loss to the
disorganized and the gain to the organized can change for many reasons,
such as changes in technology or tastes. For example, interest rate ceilings
on deposits were imposed after lobbying by savings-and-loan
institutions, 66 and benefited banks and savings-and-loans for several
years. However, money market funds and other technological innovations
caused banks to lose the benefits of interest rate ceilings, and as a
consequence 167banks dropped their opposition to interest rate
deregulation.
In his application of private-interest theory to regulatory reform in the
banking industry, Randall Kroszner has provided several other
examples. 168 According to Kroszner, technological changes, such as the
introduction of ATMs in the early 1970s, increased the elasticity of supply
of depositors' funds, making geographical restrictions on bank entry less
valuable to protected banks. As a result, the geographical restrictions were
eliminated, though only after they had become virtually worthless to the
banks that had earlier benefited from the competition barrier. 169 Krozner
also notes that the manner in which banking markets have been opened is
consistent with private-interest theory; because foreign banks have been
permitted to enter first through investment in existing banks, which
163
164

See id. at 10-13.
This is a basic result presented in many introductory microeconomics textbooks. For a
particularly thorough discussion, see P.R.G. LAYARD & A.A. WALTERS, MICROECONOMIc THEORY
105-08 (1978).
165 See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371-400 (1983); Randall Kroszner, On the Political Economy of Banking and
Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Markets 6 (1998) (unpublished Univ. of Chi. Graduate Sch.
of Bus. manuscript on file with author).
166 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 33, at 57.
167 See R. GLENN HUBBARD, MONEY, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, AND THE ECONOMY 373
(1994); PIERCE, supra note 33, at 71.
168 See Kroszner, supra note 165; Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives
Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions, 114 Q.J.
ECON. 1437 (1999).
169 See Kroszner, supra note 165, at 8-9.
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permits existing banks to share in the benefits of entry by being bought out
at a premium, rather than being forced to exit because of competition. 70
A.

The Economics of CRA Reform

The current impasse over the CRA can be analyzed in these terms. In
other words, let us set aside for the moment the notion that the CRA
enforcement regime remains in its current state because members of
Congress really believe that it is the best way to promote community
development in poor inner cities. Let us assume that the statute remains in
effect because the gains to organized beneficiaries are important enough
for them to maintain the status quo.
Who are the beneficiaries and what are their gains? I have already
discussed the lending pressure groups, politicians, and regulators whose
gains are easy to comprehend. Indeed, they should be viewed as "entrants"
encouraged by the statute.' 71 In the absence of the statute, they would not
exist, or they would exist in some other form. The statute has introduced a
potentially profitable field in which they have entered, and to speak of
profits in this area is not an exaggeration. Some of the pressure group
members have reportedly amassed large sums from the proceeds of CRA
settlements. Senator Phil Gramm's investigation of CRA settlements
revealed that one pressure group leader had amassed roughly $3.5 billion
that he controls to finance community development programs, from which
he earns substantial fees.1 72 Local politicians who often involve themselves
in the merger process enter into implicit reciprocal agreements with the
pressure groups and related groups. The politician promises to pressure a
bank into meeting the demands of the pressure group, in exchange for
support and financial aid from that group, and the politician typically uses
that support to seek additional support from voters sympathetic to the
pressure group's aims.
The banks form an interest group of incumbents, in the sense that they
were in existence before the statute was enacted. In general, the CRA has
been described as a very costly intrusion into the operating policies of
banks, and the administrative costs are relatively high. 73 However, the
statute does provide benefits as well, in the form of competition barriers
that favor the large banks operating in cities. In addition, to the extent the
170 Seeid.atlO.
171 There are other cases in which a statute creates its own interest group lobbying for its
maintenance. For example, agricultural policy often has the effect of creating interest groups. See
generally Christopher B. Barrett, The Microeconomics of the Developmental Paradox: On the Political
Economy of Food Price Policy, 20 AGRiC. ECON. 159 (1999).
172 See Telephone Interview with Dina Ellis, Assistant to Sen. Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) (June 8,
1999).
173 See generally Thakor & Beltz, supra note 129.
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statute solidifies relationships between politicians and some of these
banks, creating a closed circle in which a mild form of directed lending
operates, it provides an additional competitive benefit. The small banks
operating outside of the inner-cities face a comparatively light burden
under the statute.
One factor making it difficult to modify the existing CRA
enforcement framework is that the benefits to many large banks probably
exceed the costs imposed on them. As technology makes it possible for
foreign and possibly Internet banks to compete against large domestic
banks, the CRA provides one of the relatively few remaining competition
barriers protecting markets for large banks. The large banks seem to have
made their peace with the statute and have learned to use it to their
advantage. There are several reasons to believe that the deals struck with
pressure groups are probably not costly in terms of their effects on bank
policies. First, banks have an incentive preemptively to strike the least
burdensome deals with pressure groups, and there is some evidence that
this occurs. 7 4 Given that the bank receives the same CRA credit whether it
finances business start-ups within the poorest urban community or sets up
a home loan program for low- and moderate-income borrowers, the bank
will choose the least burdensome deal. And once the bank has arranged an
agreement of sufficient size to satisfy CRA regulators, it no longer has an
incentive to deal with pressure groups representing the poorest affected
parties. Second, there is a strong incentive on both sides to arrange sham
deals. The pressure group leaders want to show some sign of success, the
bank wants to move on with its expansion, and the general public is too
unsophisticated to know whether the final agreement is really a substantial
improvement upon the bank's previous plans. 175 As a result, banks often
agree to follow the lending policies they have been pursuing or planning to
pursue all along. 7 6 Moreover, the publicity surrounding CRA settlements
174

Recall the complaints leveled by community pressure groups against agreements between

Bruce Marks and Fleet Bank in Boston. See supra note 135.

175 As is true of trade protection legislation, some degree of public ignorance or apathy is a
necessary component of this process. The source of the problem is that the costs of investigating and
understanding the issues-i.e., piercing the rhetoric of the interested parties-far outweigh the benefits
to the individual city resident. If these costs were not present, affected citizens presumably would
lobby for legislation subsidizing community development lending efforts and removing competitive
barriers in current legislation.
176 See. e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 332 (discussing dramatic pledges that merely
reflect existing lending levels). Occasionally a community pressure group will point this out publicly.
For example, in the Fleet-BankBoston merger discussions, Massachusetts State Senator Dianne
Wilkerson publicly criticized the banks' community investment commitment of $14.6 billion, because
it was not significantly better than the banks' current levels of lending. See Yawu Miller, Activists Ask
Feds To Block Fleet/BankBoston Merger, BAY STATE BANNER, July 8, 1999, at 1. Several private
conversations with people in the banking industry confirm the claim that bank CRA commitments are

often extremely conservative projections based on past lending records. For the opposing view (i.e.,
that the CRA has led to substantial changes in lending), see Taibi, supra note 1, at 1488 (citing Allen J.
Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, but Strengthened Federal

245

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 17:197, 2000

can be used as free advertising by a bank. Third, and perhaps most
important, the settlement process allows bank officers to make connections
with and to gain quid pro quo claims on local politicians involved in the
process. Sometimes those claims involve a trade-off of community lending
commitments in exchange for promises 177
by local politicians to protect
banks.
the
by
enjoyed
barriers
competitive
This view of the durability of the existing enforcement framework is
supported, rather than undermined, by the efforts to modify the CRA as
part of the financial modernization legislation considered by Congress in
1999.178 The legislation initially had three CRA-related goals: (1) to
publicize CRA settlement agreements; 179 (2) to shift the burden of proof to
protesters when a bank has had a satisfactory rating for three years;8 ° and
(3) to exempt small rural banks with deposits less than $100 million from
the statute.' 8' While there are strong arguments for each of these goals, one
should note that they do not affect the central issue addressed in this paper,
the discouragement of or failure to encourage private community
investment efforts. The first two provisions have the combined effect of
curtailing extreme and bad faith settlement agreements. Presumably
lending pressure groups, in a regime in which settlements are made public,
will seek cash payments that are clearly defensible in light of their
programs and, perhaps, direct themselves toward agreements that actually
control lending. Also, shifting the burden of proof requires certain
claimants to come forth with evidence that the bank has a poor record.
This requirement should permit banks to refuse a larger number of
questionable settlement demands, though it remains to be seen what will
happen in actual experience. The third provision deals with a problem that
Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 298-300 (1993)).
177 Perhaps the most explicit recent example of such bargaining has been observed in the
Fleet-BankBoston merger negotiations over much of 1999. The merger would lead to Fleet divesting
most of its branches. This generated thee question of whether the branches would be purchased by a
large out-of-state competitor or distributed widely among small, local community banks. Fleet and
Bank of Boston have been working with U.S. Congressman Barney Frank and members of the
Massachusetts congressional delegation to save the branches for the small banks. At the same time, the
banks have been promising the congressmen that they will meet the community investment demands of
local pressure groups. Indeed, the Massachusetts congressmen apparently were successful in urging the
Justice Department to back off from a plan to push regulators to ensure that a large bank would receive
most of the cast-off branches. See Joan Vennochi, Unknowns in the Fleet-BankBoston Merger
Formula, BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 1999, at A15. The game is obvious: Fleet and Bank of Boston are
agreeing to work with local politicians in meeting demands for additional lending, in exchange for
efforts by those politicians to preserve certain competitive advantages. If, as often happens, the "new
lending commitment" that emerges from this process is largely a plan to follow previous lending
policies, then the banks will clearly have gained from their deal with the politicians.
178 These efforts culminated in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 711-715, S. 900, 106th
Cong. (1999).
179

Seeid.§ 711.

180
181

See id. §§ 711-715.
Seeid. § 712.
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is largely irrelevant from the perspective of this paper.
The final version of the financial modernization bill contains three
provisions dealing with the CRA: one barring a bank holding company
from merging with an insurance or securities firm if any of its banks
earned less than a satisfactory rating in the its most recent exam, a second
requiring disclosure of CRA settlements, and a third lengthening the
period between exams for small banks (less than $250 million in assets)
that receive a satisfactory or outstanding grade in their last exam.' 82
However, there is an exception to the third provision permitting an earlier
examination if a regulator thinks there is reasonable cause, or if a bank
files a merger application. 183 Like the initial provisions, the final
provisions hardly touch the perverse incentive issues under the current
enforcement regime.
The conclusion suggested by recent reform efforts is that the heart of
the statutory regime remains intact. Indeed, the CRA reform efforts have
for the most part been exercises in chiseling around the comers of the
statute. No reforms have been suggested to control the perverse effects of
the CRA, such as the incentive to satisfy CRA requirements by offering
the most attractive terms to wealthy city developers. No reforms have been
suggested to remove disincentives to entry in poor communities. The
disclosure requirement, the only one of the initial CRA-related goals to
survive the enactment process, may serve as a solution to the universally
disdained problems associated with hush money. Beyond this, however,
the banks apparently fracture, as evidenced by the dilution of the initial set
of CRA reform provisions.
Thus, the enforcement regime we see today appears to be an
equilibrium, in the sense that no party who can effectively control the
outcome has an incentive to deviate from the existing practice. The large
banks calculate their willingness to support or to tolerate the current
regime by trading off the benefits from competition barriers against the
costs of regulation. For them, the marginal benefits probably exceed the
marginal costs. The entrant groups all support the statute for obvious
reasons.
Is there any likelihood that this equilibrium will change? Lawrence
White, in a perceptive critique of the statute, argued that it results in crosssubsidization by large banks, and that competition would eventually make
this equilibrium unsustainable. 184 Thus, applying White's thesis within the
framework developed here leads to the suggestion that the current
enforcement framework will remain in effect as long as large banks can
profitably comply with the statute by cross-subsidizing inner-city lending.
182

See At a Glance: Gramm-Leach-BlileyAct of1999, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 1999, at 4.

183

See id.

184

See White, supra note 7, at 285.
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Any technological change that makes this cross-subsidization infeasible
should result in large banks opposing the current regime, leaving only the
entrant groups in support. Although the entrant groups may be strong
enough to keep the existing framework for a period of time, they will
eventually lose as the costs borne by banks, an organized interest group,
grows relative to their benefits.
To make cross-subsidization by large banks unsustainable, some
event must take place that eliminates advantages large banks have in the
community investment regulatory process. One such event might be
elimination of the scale-economy benefits of size. If large banks enjoyed
no scale economies, they would no longer have an advantage over the
small banks in subsidizing lending. However, it is unclear how scale
economies could be eliminated in the banking industry. The Internet may
one day reduce the importance of scale economies in banking, but so far
this has not happened. In addition, if Internet banks are subjected to more
onerous regulations, they may not be able to compete against large banks
at all.
Since the advantages of size are likely to remain for some time in the
banking industry, perhaps the only general prediction of the point at which
the CRA is vulnerable to reform is that it will happen when large banks
find that the competition benefits are not worth the regulatory costs. This
is an open question, because it depends on how the CRA will be applied to
Internet banking and new competitive threats. To the extent large banks
can control this, they have incentives to enter into political coalitions with
other interest groups (specifically regulators and perhaps some lending
pressure groups) to seek regulations that maintain the advantages enjoyed
by large banks. Regulators have incentives to support such rules because
the value of their human capital is dependent upon the maintenance of the
existing regulatory process. Lending pressure groups have strong reasons
to support such rules, because their long-term interests are tied to those of
the large banks they file protests against.
B.

Some GeneralLessons for Regulatory Entrenchment and Reform

This discussion suggests some general observations on the economic
theory of regulation. The theory predicts that reform is likely to occur
when the gains to concentrated beneficiaries have disappeared, as a result
of technological change or changes in consumer tastes. 85 This explanation
seems to fit the facts in the case of geographical restrictions in the banking
industry and in the case of interest rate ceilings. However, the CRA is
distinguishable from these examples.
185

See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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Restrictions on entry form a fixed barrier to competition that can be
eliminated by technological change. For example, if consumers can carry
out their banking transactions over a phone, or at an ATM machine, then
rules preventing banks from setting up branches outside of their own
geographical markets will do little to protect banks from having to
compete with rivals outside of their geographical markets. Short of
prohibiting the new technological innovation, there is nothing a legislator
or regulator can do to prevent this outcome. Once technological change
makes the physical location of a bank irrelevant in terms of its effect on
competition; regulators cannot reinterpret geographical banking
restrictions in a way that preserves competition barriers.
This vulnerability to technological change may not be observed in the
case of other rules. The CRA is a malleable statute that can be modified
and reinterpreted in ways that redistribute the benefits and costs among
affected parties, and this feature gives the statute some resiliency in the
face of technological change. Put another way, the economic theory of
regulation should be modified to distinguish rules that are brittle, in the
sense that they are vulnerable to obsolescence as a result of changes in
technology or consumer tastes, from rules that are capable of being
modified over time to maintain political support.
In particular, a malleable statute such as the CRA is capable of being
modified or reinterpreted over time in a manner that fractures opposition
among concentrated interest groups. In the banking sector, as in most
industries, there is one concentrated, well-organized group that has been in
place from the beginning: the finance producers (or, specifically, the
banks). After the statute has been enacted, various entrant groups, such as
the lending pressure groups, emerge and form concentrated groups as well.
However, entrant groups are unlikely to be, as a rule, as well-organized as
the producers. For example, in the CRA context, the lending pressure
groups generally are not in communication with each other and are
dispersed all over the country. Given this, maintaining a regulatory statute
that burdens banks probably requires some fracturing or division among
the banks. We see such a division with respect to the compliance costs of
the CRA. To the extent that the statute provides a competitive advantage to
some banks, it fractures the most reliably-concentrated interest group, and
produces a sub-group among them that is willing to tolerate the statute.
There is enough here to sketch a general theory of regulatory
entrenchment. A malleable statute can be defined generally as one that is
either invulnerable to technological change or that can be modified in
order to maintain its regulatory force. Thus, the Sherman Act could serve
as an example of an extremely malleable statute, because it is unlikely that
changes in technology or tastes will ever make the Sherman Act's
prohibition against anti-competitive conduct irrelevant. The Sherman Act
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will always be viewed by some firms as providing a competitive weapon
against rivals,' 8 6 whether or not those rivals are acting in a manner that
actually harms competition. Minimum wage legislation serves as an
example of the second type of malleable statute, one that can be revised
over time to maintain its regulatory force. The minimum wage can easily
become obsolete over time, as inflation erodes the real value of the wage
floor. For example, while a minimum wage of $2.00 per hour may have
constrained some firms thirty years ago, it would have little regulatory
force today, given that most firms pay workers well above $2.00 per hour.
However, obsolescence through inflation is not a serious problem for the
interest groups that benefit from minimum wage legislation, because the
legislature can always re-vote to increase the minimum.
The CRA, the Sherman Act, and minimum wage legislation have in
common the feature that they create divisions among the burdened
regulatory group. 8 7 I have already discussed the divisions created by the
CRA. The Sherman Act's passage was heavily influenced by pressure
from rural cattle producers who were being put out of competition by large
meat-processing facilities in cities like Chicago.'
Thus, at least some
portion of the firms affected by the Sherman Act anticipated that it would
become a competitive weapon. Minimum wage legislation creates
divisions among affected businesses because it provides a competitive
barrier against low-wage domestic competitors for firms in certain
markets.
'The general lesson for regulation suggested by experience with the
CRA can be summarized as follows. First, a regulatory statute must be
malleable in order to be durable. Otherwise, changes in technology and
consumer tastes will render the statute obsolete. Second, the statute's
durability is enhanced greatly if it fractures or creates divisions among the
regulated firms. Fracturing the regulated interest group is important,
because the firms are generally the most well-organized interest group. I
have mentioned entrants as another organized interest group--for
example, the regulators and local politicians whose human capital is tied to
maintenance of the existing regulatory regime-but I doubt that the entrant
groups associated with the CRA have the necessary organization and
186 For a discussion of the use of antitrust law by firms to block pro-competitive mergers, see
William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON.
247 (1985).
187 Studies also suggest that such divisions exist among firms regulated by OSHA. See Ann
P. Bartel & Lacy G. Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA 's
Impact, 28 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1985) (presenting evidence that OSHA's enforcement of health and safety
regulations favor large, unionized firms at the expense of small, non-union firms).
188 See Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Antitrust Before the Sherman Act, in THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 255-70 (Fred S. McChesney &
William F. Shughart 11eds., 1995).
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political clout to maintain the current regime in the absence of support or
acceptance within some subgroup of regulated banks. Third, given these
features, a regulatory statute can remain in force indefinitely as long as
regulators and legislators reinterpret and alter the statute over time in a
way that maintains political support, which may require the maintenance
of divisions among regulated firms. Indeed, regulators should, under this
theory, reinterpret a regulatory statute in a way that maintains support from
the smallest subgroup of regulated firms necessary to maintain a dominant
legislative coalition in support of the statute.
Conclusion
Borrowing largely from the economic development literature, I have
tried to set out a detailed theory of market failure that explains the shortage
of credit and capital extended by financial institutions to residents of lowincome urban communities. The asymmetric information theory yields
predictions that are quite consistent with observations in the lending
market, and unlike discrimination theory, this theory is not vulnerable to
the critique that competition should provide a sufficient cure.
The second goal of this paper was to examine regulatory obstacles to
development lending. The general framework of banking regulations,
fairness coupled with safety and soundness regulation, inhibits the growth
of large-scale development lending efforts in the private sector. A superior
regulatory regime would modify both forms of regulation with a view
toward encouraging economic development.

